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This paper examines the influence of increasing access to the Internet and increasing 
online purchasing on sales tax competition among the states.  Prior research indicates that 
the tax rates set by a state’s geographical neighbors influence the tax rate set by the home 
state.  As consumers gain access to the Internet and begin to participate in online 
shopping, their opportunity cost to participate in cross-border shopping decreases and 
their “mobility” may increase due to the ease of purchasing from vendors lacking nexus 
in the consumer’s home state.  Thus, states may begin to respond less to the sales tax 
changes of their geographic neighbors and may begin to define competitors differently.  I 
find that increases in both the percentage of the population having Internet access and the 
percentage of the population making online purchases influence the response of a state to 
its neighbors’ tax rates.  Specifically, states with higher percentages of either of these 
measures have more positive response functions when examining the “effective Internet 
tax rate” definition of neighbor.  States appear to respond only slightly to changes in the 
tax rates of their geographic neighbors. 
 
This paper also examines the influence of Internet usage on the sales tax revenues of the 
states by separating the influences of cross-border shopping through traditional means 
and through the Internet.  Research finds that consumers who live near physical borders 
are more responsive to tax differences than are consumers who live farther from physical 
borders.  As more consumers access the Internet and begin to purchase goods online, all 
consumers may become as responsive to tax differences as are those who live near 
physical borders.  Thus, both traditional means of cross-border shopping and cross-border 
shopping through use of the Internet would be expected to influence the sales tax 
revenues of a state.  Surprisingly, I find that sales tax revenue per capita appears to 
increase with an increase in my measure of Internet-based cross-border shopping.  This 
may indicate that online shopping does not act entirely as a substitute for local forms of 
shopping but rather represents an increase in consumption. 
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1. Introduction 
Cross-border shopping, in which consumers have the freedom to cross a border to 
purchase taxed goods in lower taxing jurisdictions, has been of increasing concern to 
state and local policymakers, as evidenced by the creation of the Streamlined Sales Tax 
Project (SSTP).  Policymakers anticipate increased amounts of cross-border shopping due 
to the development of Internet commerce, which offers a way for consumers to purchase 
from out-of-state vendors without physically crossing the border.  Many Internet vendors 
lack nexus in multiple states, allowing them to offer products without collecting the same 
taxes that local vendors are required to collect.  The resulting tax differentials create 
cross-border shopping opportunities for consumers, whether or not they live near physical 
borders. 
Previous studies have found evidence of a border tax effect in which consumers 
near geographic borders respond to differences in tax rates between jurisdictions by 
traveling across the border to purchase items in the lower taxing jurisdiction (Ferris 2000, 
Walsh and Jones 1988, Fox 1986, Mikesell 1970).  However, as Goolsbee (2000a) points 
out, “perhaps the key issue that the Internet poses for tax policy is not so much its 
potential to create a world without borders but rather to create a world of only borders.”1  
In other words, in the world of Internet commerce, all consumers may be as responsive to 
tax differences as are those who live near actual geographic borders. 
Policymakers realize that cross-border shopping represents a loss of tax revenue 
to their jurisdictions.  Thus, research also examines whether state and local governments 
consider the taxes of other state and local governments in setting their own tax rates, 
                                                 
1 Goolsbee (2000a).  Page 562. 
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known as horizontal tax competition.  Empirical research on horizontal tax competition 
indicates that state and local governments do consider the taxes of their neighbors in 
setting their own tax rates (Conway and Rork 2004, Luna 2004, Rork 2003, Brueckner 
and Saavedra 2001, Buettner 2001, Hayashi and Boadway 2001, Heyndels and Vuchelen 
1998).  Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) and Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) find evidence 
of property tax competition.  Hayashi and Boadway (2001) find that governments 
respond to changes in their neighbors’ business income tax rates.  Conway and Rork 
(2004) show evidence of tax competition in estate, inheritance, and gift taxes, and Luna 
(2004) finds support for sales tax competition.  Rork (2003) shows that tax rates on 
mobile tax bases experience positive responses to the corresponding tax rates set in 
neighboring jurisdictions.2  He finds that jurisdictions respond to an increase in these tax 
rates by neighboring jurisdictions by increasing their own tax rate.  Thus, research 
suggests that governments look at the tax rates of their neighbors when determining their 
own tax rates. 
The rapid growth of e-commerce presents consumers with new opportunities to 
participate in cross-border shopping without leaving the comfort of their homes.  In fact, 
The United States Census Bureau recently reported that retail e-commerce sales for the 
fourth quarter of 2005 were $22.9 billion.  Although this total represents only 2.4 percent 
of the total retail sales for the quarter, the growth of online sales outpaces the overall 
growth of retail sales by a wide margin.  While total retail sales grew 6.0 percent between 
the fourth quarter of 2004 and the fourth quarter of 2005, e-commerce sales grew by 23.0 
                                                 
2 Tax base mobility refers to the ability of the tax base to move among taxing jurisdictions. 
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percent for that same period.3  With such a rapid growth rate, Internet sales are likely to 
become an increasingly important part of the economy, with business-to-business (B2B) 
transactions constituting the large majority of e-commerce transactions.  This rapid 
growth has fueled debate among policymakers and has prompted many states to join 
together to develop the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP).  Thus, studies of cross-
border shopping and the resulting sales tax revenue loss, as well as the related tax 
competition among state and local governments, should be of importance to state and 
local policymakers. 
The swift expansion of e-commerce serves to increase the mobility of the tax base 
with respect to sales taxes and to decrease consumers’ opportunity costs related to cross-
border shopping.  Thus, state officials may begin to respond differently to the sales tax 
rate changes of their geographic neighbors as consumers in their state gain access to the 
Internet and its increased opportunities for cross-border shopping.  Further, policymakers 
may no longer be concerned only with the sales tax rates of their geographic neighbors, 
because the Internet makes physical location much less important.  In this study, I 
examine horizontal sales tax competition on the state level and the influence of the 
Internet on sales tax competition.  Specifically, I look at whether increasing use of the 
Internet by a state’s residents changes the way a state defines its “neighbors” and changes 
the influence of the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate on the state’s own sales tax rate.  
I employ a model of tax competition based on the theoretical model of Mintz and Tulkens 
(1986) and the empirical model in Rork (2003) and include additional fiscal measures 
                                                 
3 In addition, e-commerce retail sales increased by 3.3 percent between the third and fourth quarters of 
2005, while total retail sales increased by only 0.3 percent.  Total e-commerce retail sales have increased 
from less than $5.4 billion in the fourth quarter of 1999 to $22.9 billion in the fourth quarter of 2005. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/data/pdf/05Q4.pdf) 
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that might be expected to influence the state’s sales tax rate.  In addition, I incorporate a 
measure of Internet access and Internet purchasing using data from a period of increasing 
access to and usage of the Internet to look at the influence of the Internet on state sales 
tax competition.  I also apply a new definition of a state’s neighbors that incorporates the 
influence of online purchasing as a method of cross-border shopping.  Finally, I examine 
the influence of online purchasing on a state’s sales tax revenues by using measures of 
traditional methods of cross-border shopping as well as a measure of Internet purchasing 
to determine the impact of both forms of cross-border shopping on the resulting sales tax 
revenue for the state.   
I cannot examine the influence of B2B e-commerce on sales tax competition and 
sales tax revenues due to the lack of data available for state-by-state measurement of B2B 
commerce.4  Studies estimate that B2B e-commerce transactions make up a very large 
portion of e-commerce activity (Bruce and Fox 2004).  However, many B2B transactions 
are typically tax exempt, and businesses tend to comply with the use tax at much higher 
rates than do consumers because they are much more likely than individual consumers to 
face sales tax audits (GAO 2000, Pedwell 2002).  In fact, Bruce and Fox (2004) estimate 
compliance rates for B2B transactions at more than 70 percent, and Goolsbee and Zittrain 
(1999) assume that no revenue losses occur from B2B Internet sales.  Although a portion 
of the estimated revenue loss related to electronic commerce comes from B2B 
transactions, I would expect this to bias against finding the expected results. 
                                                 
4 Some B2B e-commerce may be picked up by the Internet measures used in the paper, particularly the 
Internet sales figures for the top 100 Internet retailers.  However, these figures likely represent primarily 
B2C e-commerce and cannot be assumed to adequately represent B2B purchases. 
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I find that increases in both the percentage of the population having Internet 
access and the percentage of the population making online purchases influence the 
response of a state to its neighbors’ tax rates.  Specifically, states appear to respond to an 
increase in the “effective Internet tax rate” by increasing their own sales tax rate, and the 
increase is larger for states with higher percentages of Internet users.  This may indicate 
that policymakers choose to raise their sales tax rate as a way to capture additional 
revenue from local purchases rather than attempting to curb online purchasing by 
lowering the sales tax rate.  In contrast, states exhibit a much smaller response to changes 
in the tax rates of their geographic neighbors than to a change in the “effective Internet 
tax rate.”  As Internet usage increases and physical location matters less for commerce, 
states appear to respond to increases in the sales tax rates of their geographic neighbors 
with very small increases in their own sales tax rate.  Thus, increases in the sales tax rates 
of bordering states seem to make it somewhat easier to raise sales tax rates in the home 
state, consistent with findings in several previous studies (e.g., Hill 2004, Luna 2004, 
Hewett and Stephenson 1983).  However, the influence of these geographic neighbors 
appears to be quite small during this time period, possibly reflecting a change in the focus 
of policymakers from more traditional forms of fiscal competition to fiscal competition in 
which physical location is much less relevant for commerce.  I also find that, contrary to 
expectations, sales tax revenue per capita appears to increase with an increase in my 
measure of Internet-based cross-border shopping.  This finding may indicate that online 
shopping does not act entirely as a substitute for local forms of shopping but rather 
represents an increase in consumption.  These findings suggest that electronic commerce 
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may not, at least to this point, represent the drain on sales tax revenues that policymakers 
have been concerned that it would. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The second section provides 
theory and background and develops the hypotheses.  The third section discusses the 
research design, including the data sources and research method.  The fourth section 
describes the results, and the fifth section presents additional analyses.  The final section 
discusses the contributions, limitations, and extensions of the study. 
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2. Theory and Prior Research 
Cross-Border Shopping and Sales Tax Competition 
 Considerable research addresses the issues of cross-border shopping and tax 
competition among various taxing jurisdictions when the tax base is mobile.  As 
described in Brueckner (2003), tax competition models use a resource-flow framework in 
which a tax is levied on a mobile resource that can move among jurisdictions.  Thus, the 
tax rate in one jurisdiction influences the tax base of the other jurisdiction.  If the 
neighboring state increases its tax rate, the tax base tends to migrate into the home state.  
The additional revenue related to such migration may lead the home state to increase its 
tax rate, decrease its tax rate, or leave its tax rate unchanged.  The home state may 
decrease its tax rate and maintain its original level of tax revenues (and public services).  
If the home state’s residents value public services more than private goods, the home 
state may leave its tax rate unchanged and use the additional revenues to increase public 
services, or the home state may choose to increase its tax rate and increase public services 
by a larger amount.5  The theoretical frameworks developed by Mintz and Tulkens (1986) 
and Kanbur and Keen (1993) describe horizontal commodity tax competition and the 
cross-border shopping effect.  These studies indicate that fiscal decisions made by one 
government typically have an impact on the tax revenues of other governments. 
The Mintz and Tulkens (1986) model describes a two-region economy in which 
each region imposes an origin-based commodity tax on a private good, the proceeds of 
which are used to finance a local public good.   Each region chooses the levels of its 
                                                 
5 Both the resource-flow models and the spillover (e.g., yardstick competition) models lead to the same 
empirical specification, in which the tax rate for one jurisdiction depends on the tax rate choices of other 
jurisdictions. 
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domestic commodity tax and of its local public good by maximizing a representative 
resident’s utility while balancing the budget and assuming a constant tax in the 
neighboring region.  The consumers in each region allocate their purchases between 
purchases in the domestic region and purchases in the neighboring region based on the 
structure of relative prices, taxes, and transportation costs, creating a regional market 
equilibrium.  If the tax-inclusive price of the domestic region’s good is less than the tax-
inclusive price of the neighboring region’s good plus the transportation cost of traveling 
to the other region, consumers purchase only in the home region.  If the tax-inclusive 
price of the domestic region’s good is less than the tax-inclusive price of the neighboring 
region’s good plus the transportation cost for only a portion of the home region’s 
consumers, consumers in the domestic region purchase goods from both regions.  
Consumers purchase goods in the neighboring region until the marginal tax-inclusive 
price of the domestic good equals the marginal tax-inclusive price of the neighboring 
region’s good plus the transportation costs.6  Finally, if the tax-inclusive price of the good 
in the home region is strictly greater than the tax-inclusive price of the neighboring 
region’s good plus the transportation costs, consumers purchase only in the neighboring 
region.  Thus, fiscal competition between the two regions occurs because one region’s 
choice of tax rates alters the tax base of the other.  Further, states may respond to an 
                                                 
6 The theoretical frameworks discussed here address the consumer’s decision to make purchases in either 
the home region or the bordering region and show that transportation costs represent an important variable 
in the consumer’s decision.  Tax competition models, discussed below, model the policy decision of the 
region as a function of its own characteristics and the tax rates of its neighbors.  Although transportation 
costs might be expected to influence a region’s sales tax base, they would likely have no direct influence on 
the sales tax rate set by the region.  Thus, models of the sales tax rate do not include the consumer’s 
transportation cost.  However, these models do control for the region’s sales tax base.  In addition, prior 
research indicates that transportation costs are difficult to measure adequately (e.g., Luna 2004). 
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increase in the neighboring region’s tax rate by increasing rates, decreasing rates, or 
leaving rates the same.7 
Kanbur and Keen (1993) also provide a framework for tax competition and cross-
border shopping.  Their model is a two-country model with a single taxed good.  In this 
model, each government attempts to maximize its tax revenue, assuming that the tax rate 
of the neighboring country is constant.  Origin based consumption taxes are enforced 
such that the store at which goods are purchased must charge the tax rate of the 
jurisdiction in which it is located.  Further, border tax adjustments are not made on 
purchases made in either region by the residents of the other region.8  The authors set 
producer prices to be equal in the two regions, so the net price charged in each region is 
equal to the tax imposed in that region.  Consumers determine where to purchase goods 
by comparing the tax on the good in the home region to the tax on the good in the 
neighboring region plus the cost of traveling to the neighboring region (the transportation 
cost).  Cross-border shopping occurs when the total of the tax in the neighboring region 
and the transportation cost is less than the tax in the home region.  Kanbur and Keen find 
that the home country’s response to the foreign country’s tax rate depends on the relative 
size of the two countries.  They show that in equilibrium, the small country will charge a 
                                                 
7 Mintz and Tulkens (1986) find that the home region may increase, decrease, or leave its tax rate 
unchanged in response to an increase in the neighbor’s tax rate depending on how much its residents prefer 
the public good or the private good.  If residents prefer the public good, the home region may choose to 
increase the amount of the public good because of the increase in cross-border shopping revenues it 
receives after the neighbor’s tax increase and leave the home tax rate unchanged.  The home region may, 
on the other hand, choose to increase the amount of the public good provided by more than the amount of 
the additional cross-border shopping revenue, requiring it to increase its tax rate.  Finally, the home region 
may choose to leave the amount of the public good unchanged or increase it by less than the additional 
cross-border shopping revenue, allowing it to decrease its tax rate. 
8 Kanbur and Keen (1993) refer to this type of tax as being levied on a destination basis.  However, as 
Mintz and Tulkens (1986) point out, without government monitoring and border tax adjustments, “a 
destination-based tax becomes de facto an origin-based tax.”  Thus, the model, in effect, describes an origin 
tax. 
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lower tax rate than the large country because the small country stands to gain relatively 
more from cross-border shopping than does the large country.  Due to the small size of 
one country, the large country finds that undercutting the tax rate of the small country 
provides insufficient revenue from cross-border shopping to offset the loss in revenue 
related to the lower tax rate.  In contrast, depending on the level of the large country’s tax 
rate, the small country may gain by undercutting the large country’s tax rate.  At this 
point, the revenue gained from cross-border shoppers from the large country exceeds the 
loss in revenue related to the lower tax rate.  Thus, countries may compete for tax 
revenues differently depending on their relative size. 
 Several researchers have examined the occurrence of cross-border shopping 
effects.  Among these studies, Mikesell (1970) looks at retail sales in central cities and 
finds that sales tax rate differentials exert a significant negative influence on per capita 
city retail sales.  In other words, central cities that face an adverse sales tax rate 
differential have lower per capita retail sales.  Fox (1986) analyzes the effect that 
differential tax structures have in altering the location of employment and retail sales 
along state borders.  He examines three metropolitan areas along the Tennessee state 
border and finds that, for two of the three areas studied, an increase in the state and local 
sales tax rate reduces the level of retail activity on that side of the state border.  In 
addition, Walsh and Jones (1988) examine the sensitivity of per capita grocery store sales 
in 46 West Virginia counties to changes in the state sales tax rate.  They find that, as the 
sales tax was phased out, grocery store sales increased more rapidly in West Virginia 
counties that border other states than in interior counties.  Thus, they find additional 
support for cross-border shopping effects.  Ferris (2000) examines the choice by 
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Canadian consumers of whether to cross into the United States to shop.  He finds that a 
major influence on the amount of cross-border shopping involves the relative tax levels 
of the two countries on goods.  Finally, Luna (2004) looks at the local sales tax rates and 
bases in 95 Tennessee counties and finds that the sales tax rates of both the home county 
and competing counties influence the sales tax base of the home county due to cross-
border shopping. 
In related studies, empirical research on horizontal tax competition indicates that 
state and local governments consider the taxes of their neighbors in setting their own tax 
rates.  (See Wilson (1999) and Brueckner (2003) for overviews of empirical research on 
tax competition and strategic interaction among governments.)  For example, Brueckner 
and Saavedra (2001) examine property tax competition among cities in the Boston 
metropolitan area and find that local governments engage in property tax competition.  
Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) analyze Belgian municipalities and find evidence of tax 
competition for both income and property taxes.  Further, they find that these tax 
competition effects extend beyond the municipalities’ immediate neighbors.  Buettner 
(2001) looks at tax competition among local jurisdictions in Germany and finds that the 
local neighbors’ tax rates have a positive effect on the home tax rate.  Luna (2004) 
examines sales tax competition on the county level and finds that local governments 
consider the sales tax rates of neighboring counties when setting their sales tax rates in 
both the short run and the long run. In addition, research shows that horizontal tax 
competition occurs among states and provinces.  For example, Hayashi and Boadway 
(2001) find evidence that some Canadian provinces increase their business income tax 
rates in response to increases in the business income tax rates of other provinces.  
 12 
Conway and Rork (2004) find support for tax competition in the elimination and recent 
revival of state estate, inheritance, and gift (EIG) taxes.  Omer and Shelley (2004) 
investigate apportionment formula changes among states and find that states respond to 
the tax policy changes of their neighbors by enacting conforming policy changes.  Rork 
(2003) examines several types of state taxes and finds that state taxes with relatively 
mobile tax bases have positive response functions to the tax rates set in neighboring 
states.  Thus, states increase their own tax rates in response to an increase in these tax 
rates by neighboring states.  Specifically, state taxes on motor fuel, tobacco, and 
corporate income respond positively to the tax rates set in neighboring states.  On the 
other hand, taxes with relatively less mobile bases, such as the personal income tax and 
the general sales tax, respond negatively to the tax rates set in neighboring states. 
 
E-Commerce and Sales Taxes 
 Currently, states cannot require vendors that have no physical presence, or nexus, 
in a state to collect sales taxes for that state.9  Therefore, vendors who operate by mail-
order or through the Internet in a state can offer products without collecting the same 
taxes that local vendors are required to collect.  Although these products are subject to the 
use tax in the state, governments rely largely on voluntary reporting by consumers due to 
the administrative costs of tracking individual consumer purchases and collecting the 
associated taxes.10  Thus, many mail-order and Internet purchases remain effectively tax-
free.  Due (1967) noted this loophole in the sales tax structure as it related to mail-order 
                                                 
9 See the Supreme Court rulings in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of the State of 
Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 1967 and Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, decided 26 May 1992. 
10 States cannot obtain data on Internet sales from vendors that lack nexus within that state.  Thus, states 
must rely on voluntary reporting by consumers. 
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vendors.  As Internet sales have expanded in recent years (see Figure 1), the effect of this 
loophole has increased.11   
 The growth in Internet sales has led to much debate among politicians and other 
policymakers.  Because governments fail to collect taxes on many Internet transactions, 
the rapid increase in Internet sales erodes states’ sales tax bases (Bruce and Fox 2000).  
Policymakers find the erosion of the sales tax base disturbing because sales taxes are one 
of the largest sources of tax revenue for state governments (Federation of Tax 
Administrators 2005) and because 45 states and about 7,600 state and local governments 
impose a sales tax of some type (GAO 2000).  Thus, many states have joined together to 
develop the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP) in an effort to simplify the sales and 
use tax system and encourage Congress to require vendors to collect the appropriate taxes 
on sales regardless of whether they meet the current physical presence standard for nexus.  
Responding to the debate surrounding the taxation of Internet commerce, researchers in 
the areas of tax and economics have examined the theoretically appropriate sales tax 
framework, the impact of Internet shopping on sales tax revenues, and the impact of sales 
taxes on Internet shopping behavior. 
 Much of the literature related to taxation and the Internet has taken the form of 
theoretical arguments concerning the appropriateness of such taxation from an economic 
viewpoint (Zodrow 2006, Cooper 2004, Bruce et al. 2003, Mikesell 2001, Fox and Luna 
2000, McLure 2000, Goolsbee and Zittrain 1999, McLure 1999, and Fox and Murray 
1997).  Additional research empirically addresses the effect of the Internet on sales tax 
revenues as well as the effect of sales tax rates on the decision to purchase goods online.  
                                                 
11 All figures and tables are located in the Appendix. 
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Bruce and Fox (2000, 2001, 2004) look at the states’ sales tax revenue losses as a result 
of electronic commerce and estimate that these losses will become substantial as use of 
the Internet to purchase goods grows in popularity, with the greatest losses occurring in 
states that rely most heavily on the sales tax for revenue.  In their most recent estimates, 
they conclude that in a low-Internet-growth scenario, states would be expected to lose 
$21.5 billion in sales tax revenue by 2008.  In a high-Internet-growth setting, states 
would lose up to $33.7 billion by 2008.12,13  Goolsbee (2001) examines both the potential 
sales tax revenue losses related to electronic commerce and the effect of sales tax rates on 
consumers’ decisions to purchase online and finds that the potential sales tax revenue 
losses are relatively modest when compared to total projected sales tax revenue, with 
losses estimated at $6.88 billion in 2004 (approximately 2.6 percent of the year’s 
projected sales tax revenue).  However, he finds that taxes have a sizable effect on the 
decision to purchase goods over the Internet.  Goolsbee (2000a) uses data from a 1997 
Forrester Research survey to look at the influence of local sales tax rates on Internet 
commerce.14  He determines that consumers living in high sales tax jurisdictions are more 
likely than those living in low sales tax jurisdictions to purchase online and estimates that 
the number of consumers making online purchases could decrease by as much as 24 
percent if existing sales taxes were applied to e-commerce.  More recently, Alm and 
Melnik (2005) use data from a 2001 survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
                                                 
12 The estimated new state and local sales tax revenue losses related to e-commerce for 2008 range from 
$11.8 billion in a “low-growth” scenario to $17.9 billion in a “high-growth” scenario. 
13 To the author’s knowledge, information on the actual sales tax revenue losses related to e-commerce is 
unavailable. 
14 Forrester Research is a technology and market research company that provides research related to 
technology and its impact on business and consumers.  The 1997 Forrester Research survey used in 
Goolsbee (2000a) was conducted as part of the company’s Technographics 98 program and asked 
respondents about their household characteristics and whether they have Internet access. 
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and the Department of Census to examine how state sales taxes affect the decision of a 
consumer to purchase online.  They, too, find that a higher sales tax rate is associated 
with a higher probability of making online purchases.  However, their findings indicate 
that the effect is approximately one-fourth the size estimated based on the Goolsbee 
(2000a) study.  Finally, Ellison and Ellison (2006) examine data on Internet sales of 
memory modules and find that these online sales are significantly higher in states with 
high sales tax rates than in states with low sales tax rates.  In addition, they find that sales 
in the retailer’s home state, on which sales taxes would be collected, are significantly 
lower than those in comparable states.   
Previous research finds that states face considerable losses in sales tax revenue 
related to Internet commerce (Bruce and Fox 2004, Goolsbee 2001, Bruce and Fox 2000) 
and that sales tax rates influence a consumer’s decision to purchase goods online (Ellison 
and Ellison 2006, Alm and Melnik 2005, Goolsbee 2001, Goolsbee 2000a).  This study 
extends these streams of research by examining whether the expansion of Internet 
commerce, which could increase the “mobility” of consumers with respect to the sales tax 
and decrease their opportunity cost related to cross-border shopping, impacts the way in 
which a state defines its competition and the manner in which states respond to their 
neighbors’ tax rates.  In addition, this study looks at the influence of Internet commerce 
on a state’s sales tax revenues by measuring separately both traditional methods of cross-
border shopping and a measure of Internet purchasing to determine the impact of both 
forms of cross-border shopping on the state’s sales tax revenues.15 
                                                 
15 My Internet measures cannot be assumed to adequately represent B2B purchases, which make up a large 
portion of e-commerce sales. 
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Hypotheses 
 Prior literature shows that state and local governments consider the taxes of their 
neighbors in setting their own tax rates (Conway and Rork 2004, Luna 2004, Rork 2003, 
Brueckner and Saavedra 2001, Buettner 2001, Hayashi and Boadway 2001, Heyndels and 
Vuchelen 1998).  Rork (2003) finds that a state’s response to changes in its neighbors’ 
tax rates differs depending on the relative mobility of the tax base.  For example, if one 
assumes that perfect (costless) mobility exists, a “race to the bottom” might be expected 
in which any positive rate chosen by one state would be met with a slightly lower rate by 
the state’s neighbor.  The resulting equilibrium would occur only when both states have 
tax rates equal to zero.  Because of the costs of traveling to the other jurisdiction, perfect 
mobility does not exist, and both states can maintain positive tax rates.  Rork notes that 
states may respond to the decrease in state tax revenues from revenue sources with high 
levels of mobility (e.g., excise taxes) by increasing the less responsive taxes.  He finds a 
negative relationship between the geographic neighbor’s general sales tax rate and a 
state’s own sales tax rate and interprets this finding as an indication that the general sales 
tax base is relatively immobile.16  However, the rapid expansion of e-commerce provides 
consumers with increased opportunities to take advantage of cross-border shopping 
without physically traveling to a different jurisdiction.  Such a development may give the 
tax base increased “mobility” with respect to sales taxes and represents a decrease in the 
                                                 
16 Rork (2003) points out that consumers would be less likely to consistently cross the border to make all of 
their purchases than they would be to cross the border to take advantage of the tax rate on a specific good.  
For less mobile tax bases, a decrease in the neighbor’s tax rate would not necessarily result in a decrease in 
the home tax rate.  Because the tax base is relatively immobile (transportation/relocation costs are high), 
the difference in the tax rates may not offset the costs incurred to take advantage of the neighbor’s lower 
tax rate.  Thus, states may increase rates of the less mobile taxes to recover revenues from taxes with higher 
mobility that are decreased by competition. 
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opportunity cost for consumers to cross-border shop.  However, consumers are no longer 
constrained primarily to cross-border shopping in states that physically neighbor the 
home state.  Rather, the Internet allows consumers to easily purchase from vendors 
located anywhere in the United States.  Thus, as consumers in a state gain access to the 
Internet and increase their use of the Internet for making purchases, that state may begin 
to respond very little to the sales tax rate changes of its geographic neighbors. 
States may adjust their sales tax rates differently in response to the “effective 
Internet tax rate” as more consumers in that state gain access to the Internet and begin to 
make online purchases.17  States may choose to lower their own sales tax rates to compete 
with the Internet and its cross-border shopping opportunities.  In contrast, states may 
choose to raise the sales tax rate to capture additional revenue from purchases made 
locally rather than attempting to compete with the Internet by lowering the sales tax rate.  
I expect states with a higher percentage of their population accessing the Internet and 
purchasing goods online to respond differently than those states with a smaller percentage 
of Internet users.18  I examine Internet access and Internet purchasing separately to 
investigate whether states respond to the potential of increased cross-border shopping 
                                                 
17 As discussed in the following section, the “effective Internet tax rate” represents the average sales tax 
rate a consumer in a given state might be expected to pay on a random Internet purchase.  A consumer 
would not pay the “effective Internet tax rate” on any specific purchase because the sales tax rate charged 
on Internet purchases equals zero if the vendor lacks nexus and equals the state’s sales tax rate if the vendor 
collects the sales tax within the given state.  The “effective Internet tax rate” is calculated by determining 
the percentage of Internet purchases on which a consumer in a given state would be expected to pay the 
sales tax and multiplying this percentage by the state’s tax rate.  Thus, it represents a weighted average of 
the tax rate paid on purchases from vendors collecting the sales tax (the state’s tax rate) and the tax rate 
paid on purchases from vendors lacking nexus in the consumer’s state (zero).  For example, if a consumer 
must pay the sales tax on half of the purchases he makes on the Internet, the average sales tax rate for 
Internet purchases equals half of the state’s sales tax rate. 
18 The potential for online cross-border shopping is higher in states with a larger portion of Internet users.  
Thus, I expect these states to respond in a more extreme manner (i.e., with larger increases or larger 
decreases in the sales tax rate) than states with fewer Internet users as a portion of the population.  In the 
extreme case, I expect that a state with no Internet users would not respond at all to a change in the 
“effective Internet sales tax rate.” 
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represented by an increase in Internet access or to the actual online cross-border shopping 
represented by an increase in online purchasing.  Stated formally, my hypotheses related 
to the state’s sales tax rate are as follows: 
 
H1a:  The sales tax rate of states with a higher percentage of the population 
accessing the Internet will be influenced less by the sales tax rates of their 
geographical neighbors than will the sales tax rate of states with a smaller 
percentage of the population accessing the Internet, ceteris paribus. 
 
H1b:  The sales tax rate of states with a higher percentage of the population 
accessing the Internet will be influenced differently by the “effective Internet sales 
tax rate” than will the sales tax rate of states with a smaller percentage of the 
population accessing the Internet, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
H2a: The sales tax rate of states with a higher percentage of the population 
making online purchases will be influenced less by the sales tax rates of their 
geographical  neighbors than will the sales tax rate of states with a smaller 
percentage of the population making online purchases, ceteris paribus. 
 
H2b: The sales tax rate of states with a higher percentage of the population 
making online purchases will be influenced differently by the “effective Internet 
sales tax rate” than will the sales tax rate of states with a smaller percentage of 
the population making online purchases, ceteris paribus. 
 
Prior research finds that cross-border tax differentials affect retail sales, and thus 
sales tax revenues, in border areas (Walsh and Jones 1988, Fox 1986, Mikesell 1970).  As 
use of the Internet expands, consumers may choose to purchase goods from vendors 
located in other jurisdictions whether or not they live near an actual geographic border.19  
Further, Bruce and Fox (2000) and Goolsbee (2001) find that Internet commerce results 
in sales tax revenue losses. Thus, as consumers in a state increase their use of the Internet 
                                                 
19 Due (1967) points out the loophole in the sales tax structure that allows purchases from remote vendors 
to remain effectively “tax-free” as it relates to mail-order vendors.  As the Internet expands, more 
consumers may take advantage of this loophole. 
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for making purchases, the state’s sales tax revenue per capita will likely decline.  Stated 
formally, the hypothesis related to the state’s sales tax revenues is as follows: 
 
H3:  As the rate of Internet use for online purchasing increases in a state, the 
state’s sales tax revenue per capita will decrease. 
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3. Research Method 
Sample Selection and Data Sources 
The sample includes fiscal, political, and demographic information for all 50 
states as well as information related to Internet access and online purchasing rates for 
these states.20  I gather state financial data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Governments 
Division (State and Local Government Finances), and from various issues of State 
Government Finances (SGF).  I compile demographic information for the states from the 
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division; the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis.  I collect state political information from the National Governor’s 
Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures.  I compile Internet sales 
data from various issues of Internet Retailer’s Top 500 Guide and collect Internet access 
and online purchasing data from the U.S. Census Bureau, CPS Computer Ownership 
Supplement (available for 1994, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, and 2003).  Due to the 
availability of the Internet access and usage data, I estimate Internet access and usage for 
years in which the CPS Computer Ownership Supplement is unavailable.  To estimate the 
missing data, I use separate time series regressions for each state and predict the values 
for years in which the surveys were not conducted.  As a check on the robustness of my 
results, I examine these models by including only the years for which the Internet access 
and usage variables are available in addition to the primary analysis.21 
 
                                                 
20 Research in the area of tax competition typically excludes Alaska and Hawaii because they have no 
geographic neighbors and differ from the other 48 states in various ways.  Thus, I exclude Alaska and 
Hawaii in models in which the definition of a state’s neighbors is based on geographic contiguity.  I include 
Alaska and Hawaii in models that examine non-geographic definitions of neighbors. 
21 As noted in the results section, results appear similar for all models when using all years and when using 




 In any model of tax or expenditure competition, one must begin by establishing 
which jurisdictions compete with one another, or consider themselves to be “neighbors.”  
Geography represents one obvious candidate for determining a jurisdiction’s competition 
due to the relative ease of movement of the tax base among geographic neighbors.  Thus, 
much of the tax and expenditure competition research (Baicker 2005, Conway and Rork 
2004, Luna 2004, Rork 2003, Brueckner and Saavedra 2001, Case et al. 1993, Hewett 
and Stephenson 1983) has examined geographic neighbors as a jurisdiction’s competitors 
by using one or more of the following two types of geography-based weights: contiguity 
weights and population-based contiguity weights.  Contiguity weights consider 
jurisdictions to be competitors if they share a geographic border, and each bordering 
jurisdiction receives equal weighting.22  Jurisdictions that do not share a geographic 
border receive no weight.  Thus, for example, Oregon would consider California, Idaho, 
Nevada, and Washington to be its neighbors, and each of these states would receive a 
weight of ¼.  Michigan, on the other hand, would receive a weight of zero.  Population-
based contiguity weights also consider jurisdictions to be competitors only if they share a 
geographic border, but these bordering jurisdictions receive differing weights based on 
their population.  Such a weighting scheme assumes that jurisdictions with a larger 
population exert a larger influence than do less populated jurisdictions.  In the case of 
Oregon, California might exert a larger influence than does Idaho due to California’s 
                                                 
22 The contiguity weighting scheme does not account for differences such as the length of the border 
between jurisdictions.  Contiguity weights give all bordering jurisdictions equal weighting regardless of the 
length of the border, population, or other characteristics. 
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larger population.  Thus, each jurisdiction that shares a geographic border with the 
“home” jurisdiction receives a weight equal to that jurisdiction’s population divided by 
the total population of all jurisdictions that share a geographic border with the “home” 
jurisdiction.  Again, jurisdictions that do not share a geographic border receive no weight. 
 Research on tax and expenditure competition has examined other ways to define a 
jurisdiction’s “neighbors,” or competitors.  Jurisdictions may consider other jurisdictions 
to be competitors based on demographic similarities, migration patterns, income 
similarities, or other relevant factors.  For example, Conway and Rork (2004) use elderly 
migration measures to determine a state’s neighbors when examining competition in 
estate and inheritance taxes.  Case et al. (1993) examine per capita income and 
percentage of the population that is black as measures of neighborliness when looking at 
state expenditure competition.23  Baicker (2005) adds a measure of interstate mobility to 
determine neighborliness when examining competition in state spending.  Hill (2006) 
includes per capita income and industry diversity as measures of neighborliness in a 
study of tax competition among counties.  Fletcher and Murray (2006) look at 
competition in the state sales tax base using an array of factors to determine 
neighborliness, including similarity in sales tax rates, state personal income, personal 
income tax burdens, total tax burdens, percentage of the population that is in poverty, the 
government share of employment, the service share of employment, and the 
manufacturing share of employment. 
                                                 
23 Case et al. (1993) find that racial composition has an important influence on states’ expenditure patterns, 
and that states with similar racial compositions tend to experience benefit spillovers.  In addition, Craig and 
Inman (1986) find that racial composition significantly influences state spending. 
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 To expand on these definitions of neighbors, I examine three measures of a state’s 
“neighbors”: contiguity, population-based contiguity, and an “Internet neighbor” 
measure.  When examining state sales tax competition, the two geographic measures are 
appropriate because of the relative ease of consumers crossing the border to shop in a 
neighboring state (Baicker 2005, Conway and Rork 2004, Luna 2004, Rork 2003, 
Brueckner and Saavedra 2001, Case et al. 1993, Hewett and Stephenson 1983).  
Traditional forms of cross-border shopping rely on the ability of consumers to physically 
travel from one jurisdiction to another.  Thus, most traditional cross-border shopping 
would likely occur between geographic neighbors.  However, geography probably will 
matter less as the Internet grows as a channel for retail purchasing.  Thus, I employ a 
measure for a state’s neighbors that incorporates consumers’ ability to purchase taxable 
goods and services from any state through the Internet.  The Internet neighbor measure 
proxies for the “effective tax rate” a consumer in a given state might be expected to pay 
on a random Internet purchase.24  I calculate this measure by multiplying the “home” 
state’s sales tax rate by the percentage of Internet sales generated by Internet vendors 
having nexus in that state.25,26  I measure the nexus percentage by determining in which 
states the top 100 Internet vendors for each year collect the sales tax as of October 2006.  
                                                 
24 The Internet neighbor measure ranges from zero to the state’s own sales tax rate, depending on the 
percentage of Internet sales that would be taxable in the given state.  If no Internet vendor maintains nexus 
in a given state, that state’s Internet neighbor tax rate equals zero.  If all Internet vendors maintain nexus in 
a given state, that state’s Internet neighbor tax rate equals the state’s own sales tax rate.  In other cases, the 
Internet neighbor tax rate falls between these two extremes.  If, for example, 50 percent of the Internet sales 
in a particular year are made by vendors who collect sales tax in a given state, the “effective Internet tax 
rate” equals half of the state’s sales tax rate. 
25 I obtain the Internet sales figures from “Top 500 Guide,” published by Internet Retailer.  I use the 
Internet sales from the largest 100 Internet vendors in a given year and determine in which states these 
vendors maintain nexus.  I use this information to calculate the percentage of Internet sales generated in a 
given state by Internet vendors with nexus in that state. 
26 The top 100 Internet retailers account for 52.6 percent to 54.5 percent of total web sales in the given year. 
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For each vendor that collects sales tax in a given state, I assign the total of that 
company’s Internet sales as taxable in the given state.  I then add the total Internet sales 
for all companies that collect the sales tax in a given state and divide this total by the total 
Internet sales for all of the top 100 Internet vendors to find the nexus percentage for that 
state.  The percentage of sales on which taxes would be collected in a given state varies 
over time because different vendors make up the top 100 Internet vendors for different 
years and because the sales among the top 100 Internet vendors may be distributed 
differently in each year.27,28  Thus, changes in the nexus percentage result from changes 
in Internet sales distribution and not from changes over time in the states in which 
individual companies collect the sales tax.  Data ranking the top Internet vendors is 
available only for the most recent four years in the sample.  Thus, I estimate the nexus 
percentage for earlier years in the dataset using separate time series regressions for each 
state.  The use of the top 100 Internet vendors and the inability to capture changes over 
time in the states in which a given vendor collects the sales tax likely bias my estimation 
of the nexus percentage upward.  Thus, my estimation of nexus is likely higher than the 
true percentage of Internet sales on which sales tax is collected for a given state.  
However, the relative distribution of the nexus percentage among states should not be 
biased by these issues.  Thus, the t-statistics and related conclusions regarding the 
statistical significance of my results should not be affected.  However, the magnitude of 
                                                 
27 For example, KB Toys falls out of the top 100 Internet vendors in recent years, and Gateway’s Internet 
sales make up 0.93 percent of the top 100 vendors’ Internet sales for 2003 but only 0.50 percent of the top 
100 vendors’ Internet sales for 2005. 
28 The mean nexus percentage by year decreases steadily and ranges from 79.79 percent in 1993 to 59.61 
percent in 2005.  The minimum nexus percentage among states that levy a sales tax ranges from 67.16 
percent in 1993 to 54.49 percent in 2005, and the maximum nexus percentage ranges from 100 percent in 
1993 to 81.94 percent in 2005. 
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Prior research indicates that a government’s funding needs and sources of 
revenue, the tax rates of its neighbors, and the preferences of its residents may influence 
the sales tax rate the government chooses (Luna 2004, Rork 2003).  In addition, 
policymakers’ ability to adjust sales tax rates may depend on political factors.  Thus, I 
consider the influence of fiscal, demographic, and political factors on a state’s choice of 
sales tax rate.  I examine separately the influence of Internet access and Internet 
purchases on the state’s sales tax rate because states may respond to the potential of 
increased cross-border shopping represented by an increase in Internet access, or they 
may respond only to actual online cross-border shopping represented by an increase in 
online purchasing.  In addition, differences may exist between consumers who access the 
Internet and those who actually make online purchases. 
 
Competition Model 1 
I base my model on the theoretical findings of Mintz and Tulkens (1986) and 
Kanbur and Keen (1993), in which governments consider their neighbors’ tax rates when 
determining their own tax rates.  Following the Mintz and Tulkens (1986) framework, the 
model assumes that governments maximize the utility of the representative resident while 
balancing the budget.  Thus, a state may respond to an increase in its neighbor’s tax rate 
by increasing its tax rate, decreasing its tax rate, or leaving its tax rate unchanged, 
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depending on whether its residents prefer the public good to the private good and by how 
much.   
I follow the empirical models of Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993) and Rork (2003) 
by assuming that each state’s sales tax rate is a function of that state’s characteristics as 
well as the sales tax rate of its neighbors.29  Thus, the model controls for fiscal, political, 
and demographic factors that may influence the state’s sales tax rate.  I also include the 
Internet access rate and the rate of online purchasing as proxies for the increased 
“mobility” of consumers related to e-commerce and the decreased opportunity cost 
consumers face to participate in cross-border shopping.  The percentage of the population 
using the Internet may influence the sales tax rate through the opportunity it presents for 
cross-border shopping.  In addition, the percentage of the population using the Internet 
may affect the manner in which a state responds to changes in its geographic neighbors’ 
sales tax rates and may change the way in which a state defines its “neighbors.”  
Therefore, I also include an interaction between the neighbor’s sales tax rate and the 
percentage of the population using the Internet (defined by Internet access and by Internet 
purchasing).  Thus, I use the following model to examine the influence of Internet access 
on state sales tax rates: 
TAXit = α0 + β1NEIGHBORit-1 + β2INTACCESSit-1 + β3NEIGHit-1*INTACCESSit-1  
+ β4BASEit-1 + β5FOODit-1 + β6DEBTit-1 + β7TRANSit-1 + β8PINCTAXit-1 + β9CINCTAXit-1  
+ β10PROPTAXit-1 + β11SELTAXit-1 + β12EXPENDit-1 + β13ELECTit-1 + β14REPit-1  
+ β15DEMit-1 + β16UNEMPLOYit-1 + β17PCINCOMEit-1 + β18OVER65it-1 + β19-65STATE  
+ β66-74YEAR + εit 
 
                                                 
29 Denoting the home state’s characteristics at time t as X it and the tax rate for the home state as Tit, the 
linear relationship will be:  Tit = βX it + θwTjt + state fixed effects + year fixed effects + u it, where w 
represents the weighting of the home state’s neighbors and u it represents a normally distributed, mean zero 
random error term.  The home state’s neighbors are weighted using contiguity weights, population-based 
contiguity weights, and an “effective Internet tax rate,” as discussed previously. 
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where: 
TAXit = sales tax rate for state i in year t; 
NEIGHBORit-1 = weighted average sales tax rate for state i's neighbors in year t-1; 
INTACCESSit-1 = percentage of the population with Internet access for state i in year t-1; 
NEIGHit-1*INTACCESSit-1 = interaction of the weighted average neighbor’s sales tax rate 
and the percentage of the population with Internet access for state i in year t-1;  
BASEit-1 = per capita sales tax base for state i in year t-1; 
FOODit-1 = indicator set to 1 if state i exempts food from the sales tax in year t-1, zero 
otherwise; 
DEBTit-1 = per capita outstanding debt for state i in year t-1; 
TRANSit-1 = per capita federal transfers to state i in year t-1; 
PINCTAXit-1 = per capita personal income tax revenue for state i in year t-1; 
CINCTAXit-1 = per capita corporate income tax revenue for state i in year t-1; 
PROPTAXit-1 = per capita property tax revenue for state i in year t-1; 
SELTAXit-1 = per capita selective sales tax revenue for state i in year t-1; 
EXPENDit-1 = per capita expenditures for state i in year t-1; 
ELECTit-1 = indicator set to 1 if an election year for state i in year t-1, zero otherwise; 
REPit-1 = indicator set to 1 if a Republican governor and majority in state i's legislature in 
year t-1, zero otherwise; 
DEMit-1 = indicator set to 1 if a Democratic governor and majority in state i's legislature 
in year t-1, zero otherwise; 
UNEMPLOYit-1 = unemployment rate for state i in year t-1; 
PCINCOMEit-1 = per capita income for state i in year t-1; 
OVER65it-1 = percentage of the population over age 65 for state i in year t-1; 
STATE = state fixed effects; 
YEAR = year fixed effects. 
 
Competition Model 2 
Goolsbee (2000b) finds that consumers in high sales tax locations are not more 
likely than those in low sales tax locations to have Internet access, but they are more 
likely to make purchases online.30  Further, Goolsbee (2000a) and Alm and Melnik 
(2005) find that consumers living in high sales tax locations are more likely than those 
living in low sales tax locations to make online purchases.  These findings indicate that 
                                                 
30 Based on information from a 1997 Forrester Research survey, Goolsbee (2000b) finds that consumers in 
high-tax locations are not more likely to have Internet access than those in low-tax jurisdictions.  Further, 
consumers in high-tax jurisdictions do not have more computer experience, use the Internet more 
frequently, or own more consumer electronics than similar consumers in low-tax locations.  However, 
Goolsbee (2000b) finds that those consumers in high-tax jurisdictions make more online purchases than do 
those in low-tax areas. 
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differences may arise between consumers who have Internet access and consumers who 
actually make online purchases.  Thus, I use the following model to examine the 
influence of online purchasing on state sales tax rates: 
TAXit = α0 + β1NEIGHBORit-1 + β2INTPURCHit-1 + β3NEIGHit-1*INTPURCHit-1  
+ β4BASEit-1 + β5FOODit-1 + β6DEBTit-1 + β7TRANSit-1 + β8PINCTAXit-1 + β9CINCTAXit-1  
+ β10PROPTAXit-1 + β11SELTAXit-1 + β12EXPENDit-1 + β13ELECTit-1 + β14REPit-1  
+ β15DEMit-1 + β16UNEMPLOYit-1 + β17PCINCOMEit-1 + β18OVER65it-1 + β19-65STATE  
+ β66-74YEAR + εit 
 
where: 
INTPURCHit-1 = percentage of the population that used the Internet to purchase products 
or services for state i in year t-1; 
NEIGHit-1*INTPURCHit-1 = interaction of the weighted average neighbor’s sales tax rate 
and the percentage of the population that used the Internet to purchase products or 
services for state i in year t-1;  
and all other variables are as defined previously. 
  
The state’s sales tax rate represents the dependent variable.31  The weighted-
average sales tax rate for a state’s neighbors (NEIGHBOR), as described in the section 
above, measures the amount of interstate tax competition that exists (Rork 2003).32  I lag 
the weighted-average neighbor’s tax rate by one year because a delay probably occurs 
between when neighboring states enact tax rate changes and when the home state can 
respond by enacting its own tax rate change.33  Further, using the lagged neighbor’s tax 
rate eliminates the endogeneity between the neighbor’s tax rate and the home state’s tax 
                                                 
31 I examine the state’s sales tax rate using two measures for the tax rate.  The first measure considers only 
the state sales tax rate and does not include any local sales tax rates.  The second measure incorporates a 
measure of the state and local sales tax rate for each state. 
32 Only the “neighbor” variable and the interaction of the “neighbor” variable with the Internet access 
variable change based on the definition of neighbors used in the model. 
33 I also test the neighbor’s tax rate with two lags and with three lags.  With two lags, results appear similar 
to the results using a single lag.  With three lags, results appear mainly insignificant. 
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rate (Brueckner 2003, Hayashi and Boadway 2001).34  I include the home state’s sales tax 
base (BASE) because theory indicates that changes in the tax base can influence the tax 
rate, and changes in the tax rate can influence the tax base (Kanbur and Keen 1993, 
Hettich and Winer 1988, Mintz and Tulkens 1986).35  I also include an indicator variable 
to represent whether the state exempts food items from the sales tax (FOOD).36  States 
that exempt food items from the sales tax may increase the sales tax rate on other items to 
compensate for the revenue foregone on food purchases.  The Internet access rate 
(INTACCESS) and the percentage of the population using the Internet for online 
purchasing (INTPURCH) measure the influence of increased access to and usage of the 
Internet, and thus potential increases in the mobility of the tax base, on the state’s sales 
tax rate.37,38   Goolsbee (2000a) and Alm and Melnik (2005) find that consumers living in 
                                                 
34 If sales tax competition occurs among states, the neighbor’s sales tax rate is endogenous.  A state will 
determine its sales tax policies simultaneously with its neighbors.  For example, Tennessee’s sales tax 
policies will influence the sales tax policies of Kentucky, and, at the same time, Kentucky’s sales tax 
policies will influence the sales tax policies of Tennessee.  Using the lagged value of the neighbors’ tax rate 
eliminates this endogeneity, allowing ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation to yield consistent estimates 
(Gujarati 2004, Brueckner 2003). 
35 Because the sales tax base can influence the sales tax rate and the sales tax rate can influence the sales 
tax base, contemporaneous measures of the sales tax rate and the sales tax base would be endogenous.  
However, policymakers likely make decisions regarding tax rate changes based on tax base information 
from previous periods.  The sales tax rate and the lagged sales tax base would not exhibit an endogenous 
relationship. 
36 I include an indicator variable representing the food exemption because this exemption is one of the more 
widely used exemptions.  I expect the overall breadth of the base to be reflected by the tax base measure 
included in the models. 
37 The Internet access rate and the percentage of the population that have made online purchases within the 
last year represent the percent of the population who potentially purchase items over the Internet from 
vendors in other states and likely avoid paying sales or use tax on these purchases.  Thus, these variables 
represent the potential for consumers to take advantage of cross-border shopping opportunities without the 
need to physically travel to the out-of-state vendor, increasing the “mobility” of these consumers.  Ellison 
and Ellison (2006) examine online purchases from two websites located in California and find that the 
vendors sell much less in California than they do in comparable states.  This finding provides some 
evidence that consumers are less likely to purchase from online vendors within their home state.  However, 
to the extent that consumers purchase from online vendors within their home state, I am less likely to find 
that changes in the Internet access rate or the percent of the population making online purchases influence 
state tax competition. 
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high sales tax locations are more likely than those living in low sales tax locations to 
make online purchases.39  Thus, if Internet purchasing influences a state’s sales tax rate at 
the same time that sales tax rates influence the decision to purchase online, the Internet 
access and purchase rate is endogenous.  Thus, I lag the Internet access and Internet 
purchasing variables by one year to eliminate this endogeneity. 
 The remaining independent variables in the model can be grouped into three 
general types.  The first group represents the fiscal condition of the state, including the 
fiscal stress of the state, the state’s spending level, and the other sources of revenue 
available to the state.  Variables included to control for the fiscal stress of a state include 
the state’s per capita outstanding debt (DEBT) and the per capita federal transfers or 
grants (TRANS) (Alm et al. 1993, Rork 2003).40  A high level of debt may indicate fiscal 
stress because the state may need to raise additional revenue to repay the debt or to avoid 
a downgrade of its bond ranking.  If a state experiences a decrease in federal transfers, it 
may need to raise taxes to generate enough revenue to offset the loss.  In addition, federal 
transfers represent a source of revenue for states that could act as a substitute for 
increasing the sales tax rate.  The state’s per capita expenditures (EXPEND) are included 
to measure the quantity of services that need to be financed (Luna 2004).  States that 
provide more services may need higher sales tax rates to raise the revenue needed to 
provide those services.  In addition, I include other taxes levied by many states to control 
for the other sources of revenue available to a state (Luna 2004).  Higher levels of 
                                                                                                                                                 
38 These measures of Internet commerce capture only business-to-consumer (B2C) purchases and cannot 
accurately capture the influence of business-to-business (B2B) purchases. 
39 Interestingly, Bruce et al. (2004) find that states with higher sales tax rates are associated with lower 
Internet access rates. 
40 Alm et al. (1993) note that the level of government debt may be an indication of fiscal pressure.  Short-
term debt, in particular, may signal that an unforeseen shortfall in the operating budget has occurred. 
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revenue generated from other sources may allow a state to maintain a lower sales tax rate.  
Thus, I include per capita measures of the state’s personal income tax revenue 
(PINCTAX), corporate income tax revenue (CINCTAX), property tax revenue 
(PROPTAX), and selective sales tax revenue (SELTAX) to control for these other 
revenue sources.41  Per capita measures of the fiscal variables are used to scale for the 
state’s size and to reduce potential problems of heteroskedasticity.  In addition, I lag the 
policy variables by one year because a delay occurs between when legislators receive 
information and when they can enact tax rate changes (Luna 2004). 
 The second group of variables represents the state’s political environment.  These 
variables include an indicator variable representing whether or not the year is an election 
year for the state (ELECT) (Rork 2003) and variables that indicate whether the governor 
and the majority in the state legislature come from the same political party (REP and 
DEM) (Rork 2003).  In an election year, politicians may be reluctant to increase a tax 
rate.  In contrast, when both the governor and the majority in the state legislature come 
from the same political party, politicians may be inclined to pass tax changes.  The 
political variables are lagged by one year because a delay may exist between when 
elections occur and when tax policy changes can be enacted. 
 The third group of variables represents demographic variables.  The state’s 
unemployment rate (UNEMPLOY) is included because states may adjust tax rates to 
persuade firms to relocate to their state if the unemployment rate is high (Rork 2003).  
                                                 
41 The other revenue sources included in the model account for the major categories of tax collections.  
However, these sources do not represent 100 percent of the revenues collected by the states.  Miscellaneous 
additional sources of revenue, including items such as licenses, fees, death and gift taxes, and other taxes 
account for the remaining revenue collections.  For 2005, these “other” sources of revenue account for a 
minimum of 3.5 percent of total state revenue (Arizona) to a maximum of 55.6 percent of total state 
revenue (Alaska) (FTA 2005). 
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The per capita income for the state (PCINCOME) measures the general welfare of the 
state’s residents (Rork 2003).  In addition, because the sales tax is regressive in nature, 
states with higher per capita income levels may prefer sales tax increases to increases in 
other tax rates (Luna 2004).  The percentage of the population that is 65 years of age or 
older (OVER65) is included because this population group tends to spend a relatively 
large portion of its income on typically untaxed services (Luna 2004).  Again, I lag these 
variables because of the potential delay between gathering demographic information and 
enacting associated tax rate changes. 
 Finally, both state and year fixed effects are included to account for unmeasured 
state and time factors that influence the sales tax rate.42  Although fixed effects always 
yield consistent results, random effects are more efficient when the individual-specific 
error is not correlated with the independent variables.  Thus, I test the model using the 
Hausman (1978) specification test to determine whether systematic differences exist 
between the fixed effects model and the random effects model.  Results of the Hausman 
test indicate that systematic differences do exist between the random and fixed effects 
models in several specifications of the tax competition model.  This indicates that random 
effects are not consistent in several cases, and fixed effects appear more appropriate.  
Thus, I use fixed effects throughout the paper to provide consistency among models and 
to facilitate comparisons among specifications.  The state fixed effects (STATE) control 
for unseen state characteristics and historical tendencies (Rork 2003).  The year fixed 
effects (YEAR) control for factors such as federal tax changes and business cycles that 
affect all the states in a particular year (Rork 2003).   
                                                 




Previous research indicates that cross-border tax differentials affect retail sales, 
and thus sales tax revenues, in border areas (Walsh and Jones 1988, Fox 1986, Mikesell 
1970).  In addition, Bruce and Fox (2000) and Goolsbee (2001) use early data on Internet 
commerce to estimate the sales tax revenue losses that can be attributed to online 
purchases.  These findings indicate that both traditional methods of cross-border 
shopping and Internet commerce may impact a state’s sales tax revenues.  Thus, I use the 
following model to examine the influence of traditional methods of cross-border 
shopping as well as online purchasing on per capita state sales tax revenue: 
SALESREVit = α0 + β1TAXit + β2INRATEit + β3OUTRATEit + β4INTERRATEit  
+ β5INTPURCHit + β6FOODit + β7DEBTit + β8TRANSit + β9LOTTERYit-1 + β10ELECTit  
+ β11REPit + β12DEMit + β13UNEMPLOYit + β14PCINCOMEit + β15OVER65it  
+ β16SCHOOLAGEit + β17COLLEGEit + β18-64STATE + β65-73YEAR + εit 
 
where: 
SALESREVit = per capita sales tax revenue for state i in year t; 
TAXit = the sales tax rate for state i in year t; 
INRATEit = the traditional cross-border shopping effect representing additional sales tax 
revenues for state i in year t; 
OUTRATEit = the traditional cross-border shopping effect representing lost sales tax 
revenues for state i in year t; 
INTERRATEit = the Internet cross-border shopping effect for state i in year t; 
LOTTERYit-1 = per capita lottery revenue for state i in year t-1; 
SCHOOLAGEit = percentage of the population between the ages of 5 and 17 for state i in 
year t; 
COLLEGEit = percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree or higher for state i 
in year t; 
and all other variables are as defined previously. 
 
 
 The state’s per capita sales tax revenue represents the dependent variable.  I 
expect the state’s own sales tax rate (TAX) to influence the sales tax revenues in the state 
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based on the assumption that sales tax revenues can be stated as the product of the sales 
tax rate and sales tax base (Borg et al. 1993, Friedlaender et al. 1973, Legler and Shapiro 
1968).43  The influence of the neighbor’s sales tax rate on the state’s sales tax revenue is 
measured by examining traditional cross-border shopping, in which consumers physically 
travel to neighboring states to purchase taxed goods, and Internet cross-border shopping, 
in which consumers purchase items from online vendors that lack nexus in the 
consumer’s home state, separately.  The influence of traditional cross-border shopping is 
evaluated by examining the flow of goods purchased in the home state by consumers 
from neighboring states and the flow of goods purchased in neighboring states by 
consumers from the home state.  In the case in which a state’s sales tax rate is less than its 
neighbor’s sales tax rate, I expect consumers from neighboring states to purchase taxable 
goods in the home state, thus generating additional sales tax revenues for the home state.  
I measure the influence of this cross-border shopping into the home state by calculating 
the difference between the neighbor’s sales tax rate and the home state’s sales tax rate.  I 
then weight this difference by determining the number of consumers from the 
neighboring state that would likely benefit from crossing the border to purchase taxed 
goods as a percentage of the home state’s population.44  Thus, I calculate INRATE as 
follows:45 
                                                 
43 The state’s sales tax base is calculated by dividing the state’s sales tax revenues by the state’s sales tax 
rate.  Thus, including both the sales tax base and the sales tax rate as independent variables in the sales tax 
revenue equation would result in an identity.  The dependent variable would function as a linear 
combination of these independent variables. 
44 I use the number of potential cross-border shoppers as a percentage of the home state’s population 
because the home state would likely be concerned with the impact of cross-border shopping on its sales tax 
revenues as it relates to its own population. 
45 I do not include transportation cost in these measures.  Because I include only the population in counties 
that immediately border the given neighboring state in the POPWEIGHT measure, transportation cost 
should be rather minimal. 
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INRATE = (RATEDIFF1) * POPWEIGHT1 
where RATEDIFF1 corresponds to the difference in the neighbor’s sales tax rate and the 
home state’s sales tax rate and POPWEIGHT1 represents the population of the counties 
in neighboring states with higher sales tax rates that border the home state divided by the 
total population in the home state.   
In the case in which a state’s sales tax rate exceeds its neighbor’s sales tax rate, 
consumers from the home state would likely cross the border to purchase taxable goods 
in the neighboring state, thus decreasing the sales tax revenues for the home state.  I 
measure the influence of this loss of revenue to the home state by calculating the 
difference between the home state’s sales tax rate and the neighbor’s sales tax rate and 
weighting this difference by estimating the number of consumers in the home state that 
would be expected to gain from crossing the border as a percentage of the home state’s 
population.  Thus, I calculate OUTRATE as follows: 
OUTRATE = (RATEDIFF2) * POPWEIGHT2 
where RATEDIFF2 represents the difference in the home state’s sales tax rate and the 
neighbor’s sales tax rate and POPWEIGHT2 corresponds to the population of the 
counties in the home state that border neighboring states with lower sales tax rates 
divided by the total population in the home state. 
 The Internet offers consumers additional opportunities to participate in cross-
border shopping, whether or not they live near a physical border.  Thus, I measure the 
influence of Internet commerce on a state’s sales tax revenues.46  Because Internet 
                                                 
46 As noted previously, the measure of Internet purchasing used represents the percentage of respondents to 
the CPS Computer Ownership Supplement who responded that they have made online purchases during the 
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vendors collect sales taxes only for purchases made by consumers located in states in 
which they have nexus, the sales tax charged by an Internet vendor will be either the 
consumer’s home sales tax rate or zero.  If the Internet vendor lacks nexus in the 
consumer’s home state, the consumer will pay zero sales tax on the purchase, and the 
home state loses revenue equal to the purchase price of the taxable goods multiplied by 
the home state’s sales tax rate.  I measure the influence of this loss of revenue to the 
home state by calculating the difference between the home state’s tax rate and the zero 
tax rate applied to the purchase and weighting this difference by determining the 
percentage of consumers in the home state that make online purchases.  Thus, I calculate 
INTERRATE as follows: 
INTERRATE = (TAX - 0) * INTPURCH 
where TAX and INTPURCH are as previously defined.  Because INTERRATE is 
effectively an interaction between the state’s sales tax rate and the percentage of the 
population making online purchases, I also include the main effect for Internet purchases 
in the model.47  I examine Internet purchases rather than Internet access for the sales tax 
revenue model because only the actual purchase of items through the Internet would be 
expected to affect the state’s sales tax revenue.  Internet access alone would not be 
anticipated to influence the state’s sales tax revenue. 
 The remaining independent variables in the model can be classified as fiscal 
variables, political variables, and demographic variables.  Fiscal variables include the 
state’s per capita outstanding debt (DEBT) and the per capita federal transfers or grants 
                                                                                                                                                 
past year.  These responses likely represent primarily B2C e-commerce and cannot be assumed to 
adequately represent B2B purchases. 
47 I include the main effect for the state’s tax rate in the model as well, as discussed previously. 
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(TRANS) (Alm et al. 1993, Rork 2003, Fink et al. 2004).  A state may increase tax 
revenues to repay high debt levels.  In contrast, a state may have high debt levels as a 
result of low revenues (Fink et al. 2004).  Higher amounts transferred from the federal 
government to the state’s government may indicate that the state government can rely 
less on revenues generated from its residents (Fink et al. 2004).  I also include an 
indicator variable to represent whether the state exempts food items from the sales tax 
(FOOD).  States that exempt food items from the sales tax may experience lower sales 
tax revenues than would states that do not use such an exemption.  Further, the food 
exemption measure may serve as a proxy for the breadth of the state’s tax base.  In 
addition, previous research indicates that lottery revenues are associated with a decrease 
in revenues from general sales and excise taxes (Fink et al. 2004, Borg et al. 1993).  
Thus, I include per capita lottery revenues for the state (LOTTERY) to control for this 
effect.  Because simultaneity may exist between sales tax revenue and lottery revenue, I 
use the lottery revenues from the previous year to proxy for the state’s current year 
lottery revenues (Fink et al. 2004).48 
 Political factors may affect the level of per capita sales tax revenues a state 
collects.  I include an indicator variable for whether or not the year is an election year for 
the state (ELECT) because politicians may act differently with respect to making tax 
changes in an election year than they would in non-election years (Fink et al. 2004, Rork 
2003).  In addition, I include indicator variables that denote whether the governor and the 
majority in the state legislature come from the same political party (REP and DEM).  
                                                 
48 Fink et al. 2004 find that the correlation between current year lottery revenues and previous year lottery 
revenues equals 0.97.  Thus, they conclude that the previous year’s lottery revenues may serve as a good 
proxy for current year lottery revenues. 
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Politicians may find it easier to enact tax changes if both branches of government are 
controlled by the same party (Fink et al. 2004, Rork 2003).  Further, ideological 
preferences, indicated by party affiliation, may influence the tax revenues of a state 
(Merrifield 2000). 
 Demographic factors may influence the per capita sales tax revenues collected in 
a state.  I include the state’s unemployment rate (UNEMPLOY) because consumers may 
spend less on sales taxable items in times of higher unemployment (Fink et al. 2004).  I 
include per capita income (PCINCOME) as a measure of the average wealth in a state 
(Fink et al. 2004, Friedlaender et al. 1973).  I would expect a higher per capita income to 
be associated with higher per capita sales tax revenues.  I control for the percentage of the 
population that is 65 years of age or older (OVER65) because these residents tend to 
spend a relatively larger portion of their income on services that are less often taxed (Fink 
et al. 2004, Luna 2004).  In addition, I control for the percentage of the population 
between the ages of 5 and 17 (SCHOOLAGE) because states with a higher percentage of 
school age children may spend more on educational services than would a state with a 
lower percentage of school age children (Fink et al. 2004, Luna 2004).  Additionally, I 
include the percentage of the population that holds at least a bachelor’s degree 
(COLLEGE) because voters with higher education levels may prefer a different tax 
structure than those with less education (Fink et al. 2004).49 
                                                 
49 Voters with higher education levels may choose a different portfolio of taxes than would voters with less 
education.  Fink et al. (2004) find that an increase in the percentage of population with a college degree is 
associated with a decrease in aggregate tax revenue. 
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 Finally, I include state and year fixed effects.50  The state fixed effects (STATE) 
control for unobservable state characteristics that could influence the per capita sales tax 
revenues (Fink et al. 2004, Rork 2003).  The year fixed effects (YEAR) control for 
changes in business cycles as well as federal tax changes that would influence all states in 
a particular year (Fink et al. 2004, Rork 2003). 
 
                                                 
50 As with the tax competition model, I test the sales tax revenue model using the Hausman (1978) 
specification test to determine whether systematic differences exist between the fixed effects model and the 
random effects model.  Results of the Hausman test indicate that systematic differences exist between the 
random and fixed effects models in one specification of the sales tax revenue model.  Thus, I use fixed 
effects throughout the paper to provide consistency.  Results using random effects models appear quite 




 Table 1 describes the variables used in the models, and Table 2 shows the 
descriptive statistics for the data.  Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients for primary 
variables used in the models.  The mean state sales tax rate during the period equals 4.67 
percent, with a range from 0.00 percent to 7.00 percent, and the weighted average state 
and local sales tax rate for the period ranges from 0.00 percent to 8.92 percent, with a 
mean of 5.52 percent.51  The mean of the neighbor’s sales tax rate as defined using 
contiguity weights equals 4.11 percent when considering only the state sales tax rate and 
equals 4.97 percent when using the weighted average state and local sales tax rate.  When 
defining neighbors using population-based contiguity weights, the mean of the neighbor’s 
state sales tax rate equals 4.45 percent and the mean of the weighted average state and 
local sales tax rate equals 5.55 percent.  The mean Internet neighbor measure equals 3.62 
percent when including only the state sales tax rate and equals 4.33 percent when 
considering the weighted average state and local sales tax rate. 
 An increasing percentage of the population maintains Internet access and makes 
purchases using the Internet.  Table 4 shows that the percentage of the population both 
maintaining Internet access and making Internet purchases has increased substantially 
between the earliest years examined and more recent years (also see Figure 2).  The 
percentage of the population with Internet access has increased from 10.97 percent in 
                                                 
51 Weighted average local sales tax rates are calculated by dividing the local sales tax revenue collections 
for the state by the state sales tax base for a given year (i.e., Wtd. Avg. Local Rateit = Local Collectionsit / 
State Sales Tax Baseit).  These local rates are then added to the state sales tax rate to obtain the weighted 
average state and local sales tax rate. 
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1994 to 71.41 percent in 2004.  During the same time period the percentage of the 
population making online purchases has increased from 1.62 percent to 31.69 percent. 
 Table 5 presents the mean percentage of Internet vendors that collect sales tax in 
each state based on Internet sales from the top Internet vendors.  Five states levy no sales 
tax on consumer purchases and, thus, Internet vendors collect no sales tax in these 
states.52  Among states that levy a sales tax, the mean nexus percentage ranges from 
60.79 percent in Vermont to 92.59 percent in Washington.  Table 6 provides detail 
related to the nexus percentage and the calculation of the “effective Internet tax rate” for 
each state based on a ranking of the top Internet vendors during 2003.  Among states that 
levy a sales tax, the effective tax rate a consumer might be expected to pay on a random 
Internet purchase during 2003 ranges from 2.06 percent in Colorado to 5.64 percent in 
Washington when only the state sales tax rate is considered.  When the weighted average 
state and local sales tax rate is included, the effective tax rate on Internet purchases for 
2003 ranges from 2.28 percent in Hawaii to 6.67 percent in California. 
 
Tax Competition Model – Internet Access 
 Table 7 presents the results of the tax competition models including a measure for 
Internet access.53  The results support the notion that Internet access influences the 
                                                 
52 Vendors may maintain nexus in the states that do not levy a sales tax.  However, because the state 
chooses not to levy a sales tax, I cannot measure whether or not the vendors maintain nexus in these states. 
53 Models using only years for which Internet access data were collected in the CPS Computer Supplement 
yield results similar to those reported in table 5.  In addition, models using random effects rather than fixed 
effects yield results very similar to those reported in table 5. As noted previously, results of the Hausman 
specification test indicate that random effects are not consistent in several cases, and fixed effects appear 
more appropriate.  Thus, I use fixed effects throughout the paper to provide consistency among models and 
facilitate comparisons among specifications.   
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response of a state to its neighbors’ tax rates.  I discuss these results in more detail in the 
following section.  
 
Internet Neighbor 
The interaction of the “effective Internet tax rate” and the percentage of the 
population having Internet access is positive and significant, indicating that states with a 
higher proportion of Internet users have a larger positive response to an increase in the 
“effective Internet tax rate” than states with a smaller share of Internet users (consistent 
with H1b).54  These states may recognize that, barring elimination of the sales tax in the 
state or requiring all Internet vendors to collect the sales tax in the state, the state’s sales 
tax rate will always exceed the “effective Internet tax rate.”  Thus, these states may 
choose to raise their sales tax rate to capture additional revenue from purchases made 
locally rather than attempting to compete with the Internet by lowering the sales tax rate. 
The overall effect of the “effective Internet tax rate” on the sales tax rate appears 
positive and significant, indicating that an increase in the previous year’s “effective 
Internet tax rate” is associated with an increase in the home state’s sales tax rate.  This 
overall effect must account for both the main effect and the interaction effect, creating a 
linear function represented by β1 + β3*(Internet Access Percentage).  Thus, the overall 
effect of the “effective Internet tax rate” on the state sales tax rate equals 0.5767 + 
0.0021*(Internet Access Percentage).  As shown in Figure 3, this overall effect suggests 
that a one percentage point increase in the previous year’s “effective Internet tax rate” 
would be, ceteris paribus, associated with an increase in the state sales tax rate ranging 
                                                 
54 Unless otherwise noted, the p-values used to determine significance are two-tailed p-values. 
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from 0.5886 to 0.7518 percentage point, depending on the level of Internet access.  For 
example, 42.06 percent of the population in Tennessee had Internet access in 2000.  Thus, 
holding all else constant, a one percentage point increase in Tennessee’s 2000 “effective 
Internet access rate” from 4.48 percent to 5.48 percent would be associated with an 
increase in Tennessee’s 2001 state sales tax rate of 0.665 percentage point (from 6 
percent to 6.665 percent).  The increase would vary from 0.5211 to 0.6532 percentage 
point when including the weighted average state and local sales tax rate.  Thus, when 
examining the “effective Internet tax rate” as a state’s competition, states appear to have 
a positive reaction function.  Such a positive reaction function is consistent with findings 
from previous literature (e.g., Hill 2004, Luna 2004) that examine geographical neighbors 
as competitors.  This positive reaction function is also consistent with the framework of 
Mintz and Tulkens (1986) in the case in which the representative resident prefers the 
public good to the private good and with the framework of Kanbur and Keen (1993), in 
which governments aim to maximize tax revenue.  Thus, in the case of sales taxes, the 
states appear to be revenue maximizing.  The finding differs from the negative response 
Rork (2003) finds using geographical neighbors. 
The positive association between the previous year’s “effective Internet tax rate” 
and the home state’s sales tax rate indicates that, all else equal, states respond to an 
increase in the “effective Internet tax rate” by increasing their own sales tax rate.  An 
increase in the previous year’s “effective Internet tax rate” may result from an increase in 
the previous year’s home sales tax rate or from an increase in the percentage of Internet 
purchases on which the sales tax would be collected in that state during the previous year.  
Because states tend to change their sales tax rates relatively infrequently, a positive 
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relation would be expected between the previous year’s sales tax rate and the current 
year’s sales tax rate for a given state.  In addition, as a higher portion of the top Internet 
vendors begin to collect the sales tax in a given state, consumers are likely less able to 
avoid paying the sales tax through Internet purchases.  Thus, the state can increase its tax 
rate with less concern about losing its tax base to online shopping.  Further, as more 
consumers in a state gain Internet access, the positive relation between the “effective 
Internet tax rate” and the state’s sales tax rate becomes larger, indicating that 
policymakers in states with large percentages of Internet users respond to changes in the 
“effective Internet tax rate” with larger increases than do policymakers in states with a 
smaller portion of Internet users.  Thus, as more Internet vendors collect sales tax in a 
state, policymakers, especially those in states with a large portion of Internet users, can 
take advantage of the increased collection by remote vendors to increase tax revenues by 
raising the sales tax rate.  Because more Internet vendors are collecting the sales tax in 
that state, consumers who purchase online are more likely to pay sales tax on their 
purchases, increasing revenue to the state. 
The overall effect of Internet access is a linear function represented by β2 + 
β3*(Neighbor Tax Rate).  As shown in Figure 4, this overall effect indicates that a one 
percentage point increase in the percentage of the population having Internet access 
would be, ceteris paribus, associated with a decrease ranging from 0.0005 to 0.0142 
percentage point in the state sales tax rate, depending on the “effective Internet tax 
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rate.”55  The decrease ranges from 0.0065 to 0.0194 percentage point in the weighted 
average state and local sales tax rate.56  Thus, states seem to lower the sales tax rate 
somewhat with an increase in Internet access, though this response is dampened by a 
higher “effective Internet tax rate." 
The negative association between the percentage of the population accessing the 
Internet during the previous year and the home sales tax rate indicates that, all else equal, 
states respond to an increase in the percentage of the population having Internet access by 
decreasing the state’s sales tax rate.  This appears consistent with the negative association 
between sales tax rates and Internet access found in Bruce et al. (2004).  In addition, as 
the “effective Internet tax rate” becomes larger, the association between the percentage of 
the population accessing the Internet and the state’s sales tax rate becomes less negative.  
Thus, states with higher sales tax rates during the previous year or states in which taxes 
are collected on a larger portion of Internet sales tend to decrease the sales tax rate with 
an increase in Internet users by a smaller amount than do other states.  In contrast, states 
with lower sales tax rates and states in which taxes are collected on a smaller portion of 
Internet sales tend to respond to an increase in the percentage of the population accessing 
the Internet by decreasing the sales tax rate by more than other states.  It is likely that 
states with low sales tax rates rely less on sales tax revenues than do states with higher 
sales tax rates, so policymakers in these states may be more willing to decrease sales tax 
rates.  In addition, states in which a smaller percentage of Internet vendors collect sales 
                                                 
55 This finding indicates that Internet access may affect revenues in two ways.  First, revenues would be 
influenced by the lower tax rate.  Second, revenues tend to decrease from existing consumption if 
consumers purchase goods online and avoid paying the sales tax. 
56 I find that the “effective Internet tax rate” required for Internet access to have zero effect on the sales tax 
rate equals 6.76 percent when using the state sales tax rate and 11.41 percent when using the weighted 
average state and local sales tax rate. 
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tax are likely not collecting sales tax revenue on Internet purchases, so as more 
consumers access the Internet, these states likely lose sales tax revenues regardless of 
their sales tax rate, and policymakers may be more willing to decrease sales tax rates as a 
way to curb the loss in the sales tax base to online purchasing.   
The results for the control variables are generally as expected.  I find a 
significantly positive relation between the presence of a food tax exemption during the 
previous year and the weighted average state and local sales tax, consistent with the 
expectation that governments may increase the sales tax rate to offset some of the loss of 
revenue related to exempting food items from the sales tax.  I find a significantly positive 
association between the previous year’s unemployment rate and the sales tax rate, 
consistent with the findings in Rork (2003).  This finding may indicate that states adjust 
tax rates to attract businesses in times of high unemployment.  In addition, I find a 
significantly negative relation between the percentage of the population that is 65 years 
of age or older in the previous year and the sales tax rate, indicating that states with older 
populations may choose to rely on other forms of taxation to raise needed revenues rather 
than relying on higher sales tax rates.57  I find a statistically significant but economically 
small negative relation between the previous year’s per capita income and the state sales 
tax rate, consistent with the findings in Rork (2003).  Because higher per capita income 
likely results in higher consumption of taxable goods, states with high per capita income 
may be able to raise the same level of sales tax revenue using a lower rate than those 
states with lower per capita income.  Contrary to expectations, I find a significantly 
                                                 
57 Rork (2003) finds the percentage of the population that is 65 years of age or older to be negative but 
insignificant. 
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positive association between the previous year’s per capita personal income tax, property 
tax, and selective sales tax revenues and the state sales tax rate.  In addition, I find a 
significantly positive relation between the previous year’s federal transfers or grants and 
the weighted average state and local sales tax rate.  Thus, these other revenue sources do 
not appear to act as substitutes for the general sales tax in the form of a lower sales tax 
rate and may indicate that some states generally prefer to collect higher overall levels of 
revenue. 
The rho statistic describes the portion of the variation in the model that is 
explained by the state fixed effects.  I find that these state characteristics explain around 
97 percent of the variation in the model.  This finding seems reasonable because many 
factors unique to each state and its historical tendencies could be expected to influence 




The interaction of the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate and the percentage of 
the population having Internet access is positive and significant, suggesting that states 
with a larger share of Internet users have a more positive response to an increase in the 
sales tax rates of their geographic neighbors than do states with a smaller percentage of 
Internet users.  The overall effect of the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate on the home 
state’s sales tax rate appears significant but much smaller than that of the “effective 
Internet tax rate.”  As shown in Figure 3, this overall effect indicates that a one 
percentage point increase in the geographic neighbor’s tax rate during the previous year 
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would be, ceteris paribus, associated with a range of effects from a decrease of 0.1831 
percentage point to an increase of 0.1084 percentage point in the home state’s sales tax 
rate, depending on the level of Internet access and the way in which geographic 
neighbors are weighted.58  The effect would vary from an increase of 0.0074 percentage 
point to 0.1751 percentage point when including the weighted average state and local 
sales tax rate.  Taken together, these results indicate that states appear to respond to the 
sales tax rates of their geographic neighbors with only slight changes in their own sales 
tax rates.   
In the contiguity model using only state tax rates, the overall effect of the 
geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate on the home state’s sales tax rate is negative, 
consistent with the negative response function Rork (2003) finds related to the general 
sales tax and consistent with the Mintz and Tulkens (1986) framework in the case in 
which the private good is preferred to the public good.  In this case, as the percentage of 
the population accessing the Internet increases, the overall effect of the geographic 
neighbor’s sales tax rate on the home state’s sales tax rate becomes less negative 
(consistent with H1a).  This is consistent with the notion that as physical location 
becomes a less important determinant of cross-border shopping, the importance of fiscal 
competition among geographic neighbors decreases.  If an increase in Internet access 
proxies for increased mobility, the positive interaction effect is also consistent with the 
                                                 
58 The overall effect of the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate on the home state’s sales tax rate is a linear 
function represented by: β1 + β3*(Internet Access Percentage).  However, in three out of four cases, the β1 
coefficient does not differ significantly from zero.  Therefore, in these cases, the only influence the 
geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate has on the home state’s sales tax rate comes through its interaction 
with Internet Access. 
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Rork (2003) finding that more mobile tax bases have more positive response functions 
than do less mobile tax bases.   
In three out of the four models that examine geographic neighbors, the main effect 
of the geographic neighbors is not significant.  The overall effect of the geographic 
neighbor’s sales tax rate on the home state’s sales tax rate, however, is positive but quite 
small.  The overall positive response function in these cases is consistent with the 
findings of Hill (2004) and Luna (2004) related to counties and is consistent with the case 
in which the representative resident prefers the public good to the private good in the 
Mintz and Tulkens (1986) framework.  As in the model using the “effective Internet tax 
rate,” the positive response is also consistent with states maximizing revenue, as 
described in the Kanbur and Keen (1993) framework.  In these cases, as the percentage of 
the population accessing the Internet increases, the overall effect of the geographic 
neighbor’s sales tax rate on the home state’s sales tax rate becomes more positive (not 
consistent with H1a) but remains quite small.  The remaining influence that geographic 
neighbors’ sales tax rates exhibit on the home state’s sales tax rate may be related to 
yardstick competition, in which an increase in the tax rates of neighboring states makes it 
politically more feasible to increase the tax rate in the home state.  Further, as a higher 
portion of the state’s population gains Internet access, policymakers may believe that 
citizens become more informed about the tax increases of their neighbors.  In addition, if 
Internet access proxies for tax base mobility, the positive interaction effect again is 
consistent with Rork’s (2003) finding that more mobile tax bases exhibit more positive 
reaction functions than do less mobile tax bases. 
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Overall, these findings indicate that the home state’s response to sales tax changes 
of its geographic neighbors may be either negative or positive, consistent with the 
framework of Mintz and Tulkens (1986), and that states with a higher portion of Internet 
users exhibit more positive (or less negative) response functions.  The influence of the 
geographic neighbors’ sales tax rates appears to be much smaller than that of the 
“effective Internet tax rate,” indicating that geographic neighbors may have little 
influence on the home state’s sales tax rate in an environment in which physical location 
is becoming less important for commerce.  Rather, policymakers likely define their 
“neighbors” and approach fiscal competition differently in the era of e-commerce than in 
previous eras. 
As shown in Figure 4, the overall effect of Internet access on the sales tax rate 
suggests that a one percentage point increase in the percentage of the population having 
Internet access would be, ceteris paribus, associated with a decrease in the state sales tax 
rate ranging from 0.0075 to 0.0181 percentage point, depending on the geographic 
neighbor’s sales tax rate and the manner in which geographic neighbors are defined.59  
The effect ranges from a decrease of 0.0074 to 0.0236 percentage point in the weighted 
average state and local sales tax rate.60  Thus, consistent with the finding using the 
“effective Internet tax rate” as the definition of a state’s neighbor, states with a larger 
share of Internet users appear to have a slightly lower sales tax rate.  Using geographic 
neighbors, the negative association is slightly larger in magnitude than that found when 
using the “effective Internet tax rate.”  The positive interaction effect indicates that the 
                                                 
59 The overall effect of Internet access is a linear function represented by β2 + β3*(Neighbor Tax Rate). 
60 I find that the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate required for Internet access to have zero effect on the 
sales tax rate ranges from 10.65 percent to 16.92 percent. 
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association between the percentage of the population accessing the Internet and the 
state’s sales tax rate becomes less negative when the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate 
is larger.  This indicates that states with geographic neighbors that maintain high sales tax 
rates respond to an increase in the percentage of the population that accesses the Internet 
with smaller decreases in the sales tax rate than do states with lower-taxing geographic 
neighbors.  As in the models using the “effective Internet tax rate,” the finding of a 
negative overall association in these models seems consistent with the negative 
association Bruce et al. (2004) finds between sales tax rates and Internet access. 
Again, the results for the control variables are mostly as expected.  As in the 
Internet neighbor model, I find that governments, particularly at the local level, may 
increase the sales tax rate to compensate for some of the revenue loss related to the food 
tax exemption.  I also continue to find that higher unemployment rates during the 
previous year are associated with higher state sales tax rates, consistent with Rork (2003), 
and that an older population is associated with lower sales tax rates.  As in the Internet 
neighbor model and contrary to expectations, the positive coefficients on the per capita 
personal income tax revenue, per capita property tax revenue, per capita selective sales 
tax revenue, and per capita federal transfers or grants indicate that other revenue sources 
do not appear to substitute for the general sales tax in the form of a lower sales tax rate.  
Thus, some states may prefer higher overall revenue levels.  In one case, I find a 
significantly negative association between the previous year’s tax base and the weighted 
average state and local sales tax rate, indicating that a higher tax base in the previous year 
may lead to a decrease in the tax rate.  Contrary to findings in the Internet neighbor 
model and contrary to expectations, I find a significantly negative relation between the 
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previous year’s expenditures and the state sales tax rate.  This may indicate that states 
with higher sales tax rates tend to spend less than other states, all else equal.  Consistent 
with the findings in the Internet neighbor model, I find that the state fixed effects explain 
a large portion of the variation in the model, with a rho statistic of around 99 percent. 
 
Tax Competition Model - Internet Purchases 
 Table 8 describes the results of the tax competition models including a measure 
for Internet purchasing.61  The results support the idea that Internet purchasing by 
consumers influences the response of a state to its neighbors’ tax rates.  I discuss these 
results in more detail in the following section. 
 
Internet Neighbor 
Consistent with the findings when examining Internet access, the interaction of 
the “effective Internet tax rate” and the percentage of the population making Internet 
purchases is positive and significant (consistent with H2b).  This suggests that states with 
a larger portion of Internet purchasers exhibit larger positive responses to an increase in 
the “effective Internet tax rate” than do states with a smaller percentage of Internet 
purchasers.  Thus, it further supports the notion that states may increase the sales tax rate 
to capture extra revenue from local purchases rather than competing with the Internet by 
lowering the sales tax rate. 
                                                 
61 Models using only years for which Internet purchasing data were collected in the CPS Computer 
Supplement yield results generally similar to those reported in table 6. In addition, models using random 
effects rather than fixed effects yield results very similar to those reported in table 6. 
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The overall influence of the “effective Internet tax rate” on the sales tax rate 
appears quite similar to the findings from the model measuring Internet access.  As 
shown in Figure 5, this overall influence indicates that a one percentage point increase in 
the previous year’s “effective Internet tax rate” would be, ceteris paribus, associated with 
an increase in the state sales tax rate ranging from 0.6061 to 0.7897 percentage point, 
depending on the level of Internet purchases.62  The increase would vary from 0.5198 to 
0.6947 percentage point when including the weighted average state and local sales tax 
rate.  Thus, consistent with findings from the Internet access model, states appear to have 
a positive reaction function when examining the “effective Internet tax rate” as a state’s 
competition.  Again, this positive reaction function differs from the negative response 
Rork (2003) finds using geographical neighbors but is consistent with findings from Hill 
(2004) and Luna (2004).  The positive reaction function is also compatible with the Mintz 
and Tulkens (1986) framework when the public good is preferred over the private good.  
As with the Internet access model, the positive reaction function indicates that the states 
appear to be revenue maximizing, consistent with Kanbur and Keen (1993).  
As in the Internet access model, states appear to respond to an increase in the 
“effective Internet tax rate” by increasing their own sales tax rate.  This finding indicates 
that an increase in either the previous year’s home sales tax rate or in the percentage of 
Internet purchases on which the sales tax would be collected in that state during the 
previous year would be associated with a higher home sales tax rate in the current year.  
As noted previously, a positive association would be expected between the previous 
                                                 
62 The overall effect of the Internet neighbor is a linear function represented by β1 + β3*(Internet Purchase 
Percentage). 
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year’s sales tax rate and the current year’s sales tax rate due to the fairly infrequent 
changes in a state’s sales tax rate.  In addition, collection of the sales tax on a larger 
portion of Internet purchases would indicate that consumers in a given state will likely be 
required to pay the sales tax on a higher percentage of their Internet purchases.  Thus, the 
state can increase its tax rate without losing as much of its tax base to online shopping.  
Again consistent with findings in the Internet access model, a higher percentage of online 
purchasers in a state is associated with a larger positive relation between the “effective 
Internet tax rate” and the state’s sales tax rate.  Thus, policymakers in states with large 
percentages of online purchasers appear to respond to changes in the “effective Internet 
tax rate” with larger increases than do policymakers in states with a smaller portion of 
online purchasers. 
The overall effect of Internet purchases on the sales tax rate appears somewhat 
consistent with the findings related to Internet access but is shifted upward.  As shown in 
Figure 6, an increase of one percentage point in the percentage of the population making 
Internet purchases would be, ceteris paribus, associated with range of effects from a 
decrease of 0.0143 percentage point to an increase of 0.013 percentage point in the state 
sales tax rate, depending on the “effective Internet tax rate.”63  At the median “effective 
Internet tax rate” of 3.77 percent, a one percentage point increase in Internet purchasers 
would be associated with an increase in the state sales tax rate of 0.0016 percentage 
point.  The effect ranges from a decrease of 0.0184 percentage point to an increase of 
0.0119 percentage point in the weighted average state and local sales tax rate, with no 
                                                 
63 The overall effect of Internet purchasing is a linear function represented by β2 + β3*(Neighbor Tax Rate). 
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change in the sales tax rate at the median “effective Internet tax rate” of 4.59 percent. 64  
Thus, states may choose to lower or to raise the sales tax rate slightly as online 
purchasing increases, depending on the “effective Internet tax rate.”  Consistent with 
findings from the Internet access model, states with a lower sales tax rate or a smaller 
percentage of Internet vendors collecting the sales tax, and thus a lower “effective 
Internet tax rate,” appear to decrease the sales tax rate slightly as the percent of the 
population making online purchases increases.  These states likely rely less on revenues 
from the sales tax and may be more willing to decrease sales tax rates.  In contrast, states 
with a higher sales tax rate or a larger percentage of Internet vendors collecting the sales 
tax tend to increase the sales tax rate somewhat as a larger percentage of the population 
begins to make online purchases.  These states may rely more heavily on sales tax 
revenues and choose to increase the sales tax as a way to collect additional revenues on 
local purchases as well as on those online purchases for which Internet vendors collect 
the sales tax.  This finding differs somewhat from the results in the Internet access model, 
in which increasing Internet access is associated with a decrease in the sales tax rate at all 
observed “neighbor” rates. 
The results for the control variables are primarily as expected and are quite 
consistent with the findings from the model measuring Internet access.  I find that when 
measuring Internet purchases, the significantly positive relation between the presence of a 
food tax exemption during the previous year and the sales tax rate holds for the state sales 
tax rate in addition to the weighted average state and local sales tax rate.  Thus, 
                                                 
64 I find that the “effective Internet tax rate” required for Internet purchasing to have zero effect on the sales 
tax rate equals 3.4 percent when using the state sales tax rate and 4.6 percent when using the weighted 
average state and local sales tax rate. 
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governments appear to increase the sales tax rate as a way to compensate for lost revenue 
related to exempting food items from the sales tax.  I also find no significant association 
between the previous year’s unemployment rate and the sales tax rate and between the 
previous year’s federal transfers or grants and the sales tax rate.  I continue to find a 
significantly negative relation between the percentage of the population that is 65 years 
of age or older in the previous year and the sales tax rate.  Consistent with Rork (2003) 
and with the Internet access model, I find a statistically significant but economically 
small negative relation between the previous year’s per capita income and the state sales 
tax rate, indicating that states with a higher per capita income may be able to raise the 
needed amounts of sales tax revenues at lower sales tax rates than those states with lower 
per capita income.  Similar to the Internet access model and contrary to expectations, I 
find a significantly positive association between the previous year’s per capita personal 
income tax, property tax, and selective sales tax and the state sales tax rate.  As in the 
Internet access model, I find that the unique state characteristics controlled for by the 
state fixed effects explain a large portion of the variation in the model, with rho statistics 
of 97 to 98 percent. 
 
Geographic Neighbors 
Consistent with the findings from the Internet access model and the Internet 
purchases model using the “effective Internet tax rate” definition of neighbor, I find a 
significantly positive interaction between the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate and the 
percentage of the population making Internet purchases.  I find an insignificant main 
 57 
effect of the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate on the home state’s sales tax rate.65  
Thus, as in the Internet access model, the overall effect of the geographic neighbor’s sales 
tax rate on the home state’s sales tax rate appears positive and significant but much 
smaller than that of the “effective Internet tax rate.”  As shown in Figure 5, a one 
percentage point increase in the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate during the previous 
year would be, ceteris paribus, associated with an increase in the home state’s sales tax 
rate ranging from 0.0008 to 0.1322 percentage point, depending on the level of Internet 
purchasing and the measure used for geographic neighbors.  The increase varies from 
0.001 to 0.2247 percentage point when including the weighted average state and local 
sales tax rate.  These results suggest that states appear to respond to the sales tax rates of 
their geographic neighbors with slight increases in their own sales tax rates. 
Consistent with three of the four Internet access models, the overall effect of the 
geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate on the home state’s sales tax rate is positive but quite 
small.  As noted previously, these findings are consistent with the positive response 
functions Hill (2004) and Luna (2004) find related to counties.  These findings are also 
consistent with Mintz and Tulkens (1986) as well as with Kanbur and Keen (1993), in 
which governments aim to maximize tax revenues.  Further, as the percentage of the 
population making online purchases increases, the overall effect of the geographic 
neighbor’s sales tax rate on the home state’s sales tax rate becomes larger (not consistent 
with H2a) but continues to be rather small, especially in comparison to the effect 
associated with the “effective Internet tax rate.”  Again, the influence that geographic 
                                                 
65 The overall effect of the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate on the home state’s sales tax rate is a linear 
function represented by: β1 + β3*(Internet Purchase Percentage).  However, the β1 coefficient does not 
differ significantly from zero, so the only influence the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate has on the 
home state’s sales tax rate comes through its interaction with Internet Purchase. 
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neighbors’ sales tax rates exhibit on the home state’s sales tax rate after controlling for 
Internet purchasing may be related to yardstick competition.  Further, if Internet 
purchasing proxies for an increase in the mobility of the general sales tax base, the 
positive interaction effect is consistent with the notion in Rork (2003) that the response of 
a state to its neighbors’ tax rates differs depending on the mobility of the related tax base. 
As in the Internet access models, the geographic neighbors’ sales tax rates appear 
to have a much smaller influence on the home state’s sales tax rate than that of the 
“effective Internet tax rate.”  Thus, as physical location becomes a less important factor 
in commerce, fiscal competition among the states likely changes as policymakers begin 
to define the competition differently, and geographic neighbors may have only a small 
influence on the home state’s sales tax rate. 
As shown in Figure 6, the overall effect of Internet purchases on the sales tax rate 
may be either negative or positive, depending on the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate.  
The effect size of a one percentage point increase in the percentage of the population 
making Internet purchases ranges from a decrease of 0.012 percentage point to an 
increase of 0.0068 percentage point in the state sales tax rate, all else constant.66  When 
using the weighted average state and local sales tax rate, the effect varies from a decrease 
of 0.0147 percentage point to an increase of 0.0245 percentage point.67  In each of these 
models, the overall effect at the median geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate would be 
positive.  Unlike the findings in the Internet access model, states may either increase or 
decrease the sales tax rate with an increase in online purchasers, depending on the sales 
                                                 
66 The overall effect of Internet purchases is a linear function represented by β2 + β3*(Neighbor Tax Rate). 
67 I find that the geographic neighbor’s sales tax rate required for Internet purchasing to have zero effect on 
the sales tax rate ranges from 2.88 percent to 4.39 percent. 
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tax rates of their geographic neighbors.  Using geographic neighbors, the effect of 
Internet purchasing on the sales tax rate appears fairly similar in magnitude to the effect 
using the “effective Internet tax rate.”  The positive interaction effect indicates that the 
association between the percentage of the population making online purchases and the 
state’s sales tax rate becomes less negative (or more positive) when the geographic 
neighbor’s sales tax rate is larger.  Thus, states with geographic neighbors that maintain 
high sales tax rates respond to an increase in the percentage of the population that makes 
online purchases with small increases in the sales tax rate, while states with lower-taxing 
geographic neighbors appear to respond with slight decreases in the sales tax rate. 
The results for the control variables are again mainly as expected and are 
consistent with the findings from the model measuring Internet access with only minor 
exceptions.  When measuring Internet purchases, I find that the food tax exemption 
appears to be related to higher sales tax rates for both the state and local governments, 
again indicating that policymakers may choose to increase the sales tax rate slightly to 
recover revenues that would be lost due to exempting food items from the sales tax.  I 
also find a statistically significant but economically small negative relation between the 
previous year’s per capita income and the sales tax rate in three cases, consistent with 
Rork (2003).  Contrary to findings in the Internet neighbor models but consistent with 
previous models using geographic neighbors, I find a significantly negative relation 
between the previous year’s expenditures and the state sales tax rate, possibly indicating 
that states with higher sales tax rates tend to spend less than other states, all else equal.  
Similar to previous models, I find that older populations tend to have lower sales tax rates 
and that higher unemployment rates during the previous year are associated with higher 
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state sales tax rates, consistent with Rork (2003).  As in previous models, I find a positive 
relation between the per capita personal income tax revenue, per capita property tax 
revenue, and per capita selective sales tax revenue and the state sales tax rate.  I also find 
a positive association between per capita federal transfers or grants and the sales tax rate 
in three models.  Thus, higher levels of other revenue sources do not appear to substitute 
for a higher general sales tax rate.  Consistent with previous models, the state fixed 
effects explain around 99 percent of the model’s variation. 
 
Sales Tax Revenue Model 
 Table 9 presents the results of the sales tax revenue model using the state sales tax 
rate and using the weighted average state and local sales tax rate.68,69  Although the main 
effect of Internet purchasing on per capita sales tax revenue is negative and highly 
significant, the overall effect of Internet purchasing on per capita sales tax revenue 
appears generally positive, contrary to expectations.  The overall effect of Internet 
purchasing is a linear function represented by β5 + β4*(Tax Rate).  As shown in Figure 7, 
this overall effect suggests that a one percentage point increase in the percentage of the 
population making online purchases would be, ceteris paribus, associated with a range of 
effects from a decrease of 3.8 dollars to an increase of 199.2 dollars in per capita state 
sales tax revenue and with a range from a decrease of 4.4 dollars to an increase of 193.55 
                                                 
68 Models using only years for which Internet purchasing data were collected in the CPS Computer 
Supplement yield results similar to those reported in table 7. In addition, models using random effects 
rather than fixed effects yield results very similar to those reported in table 7. 
69 I also run a version of the sales tax revenue model using the per capita sales tax base as the dependent 
variable.  The results of this model yield the same conclusions as those presented using revenue as the 
dependent variable. 
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dollars in per capita state and local sales tax revenue, depending on the sales tax rate.70  
This finding contradicts the hypothesis that increasing cross-border shopping through 
Internet commerce would result in lower sales tax revenue per capita (not consistent with 
H3) and may indicate that online shopping represents an increase in consumption rather 
than acting entirely as a substitute for local forms of shopping.71  This suggests that 
electronic commerce may not, at least to this point, result in the significant loss in sales 
tax revenues about which policymakers have been concerned. 
 As expected and consistent with Friedlaender et al. (1973), the sales tax rate 
significantly influences per capita sales tax revenue.  As shown in Figure 8, the overall 
effect of the sales tax rate indicates that a one percentage point increase in the sales tax 
rate would be, ceteris paribus, associated with an increase ranging from 90.59 dollars to 
1,358.76 dollars in per capita state sales tax revenue and with an increase ranging from 
84.97 dollars to 1,055.77 dollars in per capita state and local sales tax revenue, depending 
on the percentage of the population that makes online purchases.  Contrary to 
expectations, an increase in the sales tax rate is associated with a larger increase in sales 
tax revenue for states with a higher percentage of the population making online purchases 
than for states with fewer residents purchasing online.72 
                                                 
70 The government financial data used to develop the per capita figures are stated in thousands of dollars. 
71 As noted in the additional analyses, when including only a more recent timeframe when Internet 
purchasing is more widespread, the influence of online shopping on per capita sales tax revenue appears 
insignificant rather than negative.  Models using only the years 2001 to 2004, in which the percentage of 
the population making online purchases exceeds 20 percent, also indicate that online purchasing exerts no 
significant influence on sales tax revenue per capita. 
72 The finding that sales tax revenue increases more with an increase in the sales tax rate for states with a 
higher proportion of online purchasers appears to be driven by the unexpected positive sign on the 
interaction term. 
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 The traditional measures of cross-border shopping do not appear to have a large 
influence on the per capita sales tax revenue for the state.  As expected, I find a 
marginally significantly negative association between outbound cross-border shopping 
and per capita state and local sales tax revenue.  I find no significant relation between 
inbound cross-border shopping and per capita sales tax revenue.  Previous studies (Walsh 
and Jones 1988, Fox 1986, Mikesell 1970) find that tax rate differentials influence retail 
sales in areas in which consumers can easily take advantage of such differences.  
However, the small percentage of the population that can realistically take advantage of 
such cross-border shopping opportunities and the sometimes small tax differentials 
between jurisdictions make it difficult to find significant changes in per capita sales tax 
revenue in this model. 
Results for the control variables appear as expected.  As expected, I find a 
significantly negative relation between the presence of a food tax exemption and the per 
capita state sales tax revenue, suggesting that having a food tax exemption results in 
lower per capita state sales tax revenue collections.  I find a significantly negative 
association between per capita outstanding debt and per capita sales tax revenues and 
between the previous year’s per capita lottery revenues and per capita sales tax revenues.  
These findings support the idea that high debt levels may be associated with low revenues 
(Fink et al. 2004) and that lottery revenues are associated with a decrease in revenues 
from general sales taxes (Fink et al. 2004, Borg et al. 1993).  As expected, I find a 
significantly negative relation between the unemployment rate and per capita sales tax 
revenues and a significantly positive relation between per capita income and per capita 
sales tax revenues, consistent with Fink et al. (2004).  I also find a negative association 
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between the percentage of the population between the ages of 5 and 17 and per capita 
sales tax revenues, implying that states with a higher proportion of school aged children 
collect less sales tax revenue per capita than states with fewer school aged children, all 
else equal. 
The rho statistic denotes the portion of the variation in the model that is explained 
by the state fixed effects.  These state characteristics explain almost 97 percent of the 
variation in the model.  This finding seems reasonable because, in addition to the factors 
controlled for specifically in the model, many unobservable factors unique to each state 
would be expected to influence the state’s per capita sales tax revenue.
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5. Additional Analyses 
In additional analyses, I examine the influence of Internet access and Internet 
purchasing on a state’s response to its neighbor’s sales tax rate using only data from 1999 
through 2004, when Internet access and purchasing are much more common, and using 
only the years 2003 and 2004, when data for the states in which vendors collect the sales 
tax are available.73,74  I also examine the tax competition models by separating the 
“effective Internet tax rate” into its components, the previous year’s tax rate and the 
nexus percentage, to determine whether both components influence a state’s current year 
sales tax rate.  In addition, I look at the impact of Internet access on tax competition using 
access data from the Pew Internet & American Life Project, in which Internet access is 
measured during each year beginning in 2001.  I analyze the influence of Internet 
purchasing and traditional cross-border shopping on per capita sales tax revenues using 
only data from 1999 through 2004, when Internet purchasing is more common, and using 
a natural log transformation for all monetary variables included in the sales tax revenue 
model to be consistent with prior literature that measures tax revenues.  Finally, I 
examine the sales tax revenue model using a definition for Internet cross-border shopping 
that incorporates the “effective Internet tax rate” to examine the influence of Internet 
                                                 
73 The limited time dimension in the dataset precludes me from performing common tests for a structural 
break in the data.  Thus, I choose to partition the data at 1999 based on an examination of the trend in the 
data as it relates to Internet access and Internet purchases.  I also examine results using 1998 to 2004 and 
using 2000 to 2004.  The primary results using 1998 to 2004 data appear qualitatively similar to the results 
presented for 1999 to 2004.  Using 2000 to 2004 data, results for the geographic neighbors appear largely 
insignificant, and results for the “effective Internet tax rate” appear similar to the results presented for 1999 
to 2004. 
74 I examine models using only the years 2003 and 2004 to test the models using only years for which the 
nexus variable is not estimated using separate time series regressions for each state.  Nexus for the years in 
these models is based on the top Internet vendors collected for the respective years. 
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purchasing, including those Internet purchases on which the sales tax is collected, on 
sales tax revenues. 
 
Tax Competition Model - Internet Access 
Most Recent Six Years 
Table 10 presents results for the tax competition model including a measure for 
Internet access and using data only from 1999 through 2004, when Internet access was 
more common.75  I examine models using only the more recent data to determine the 
influence of Internet access on sales tax competition during years in which a relatively 
large percentage of the population accesses the Internet.  Internet access likely influences 
sales tax policy in a more meaningful way during years in which a larger portion of the 
population maintains Internet access and a larger number of Internet vendors conduct 
operations online.  The primary results appear largely consistent with the findings using 
data from all available years.   I find a significantly positive coefficient on the interaction 
between the neighbor’s tax rate and the percentage of the population with Internet access 
for both the contiguity and Internet neighbor definitions.  These results provide additional 
support for the idea that Internet access influences the response of a state to its neighbors’ 
tax rates.   
The overall effect of Internet access on the sales tax rate, too, is significant when 
defining neighbors using either contiguity weights or the “effective Internet tax rate,” 
consistent with previous findings.  The overall effect of the neighbor’s sales tax rate on 
                                                 
75 As can be seen in Table 3, the mean percentage of a state’s population having Internet access equaled 
46.27 percent in 1999 and rose to 71.41 percent in 2004.  These percentages represent a substantial increase 
in Internet access when compared to early years in the dataset. 
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the weighted average state and local sales tax rate is significant when using any of the 
three definitions for neighbors, while the effect of the neighbor’s sales tax rate on the 
state sales tax rate is significant only when using the “effective Internet tax rate” as the 
definition of a state’s neighbors.  Again, this finding is relatively similar to the findings 
when using data from all available years.  The control variables appear largely 
insignificant when examining only these more recent data.76  The lack of significance in 
the control variables likely relates to the decrease in statistical power associated with 
using fewer years in this model.  The insignificant control variables exhibit much less 
variation during the recent time period than does the Internet access variable, and the 
reduced power of the model makes it difficult to find significance among these 
variables.77 
 
2003 and 2004 Only 
Table 11 shows the results of the tax competition model including a measure for 
Internet access using data only from 2003 and 2004, when the nexus variable is available.  
I examine these years separately to help determine whether the estimation of data on the 
states in which Internet vendors collect the sales tax (nexus) alters my conclusions related 
to the influence of Internet access on sales tax competition.78  The results indicate that the 
model is not significant.  Although the overall effect of the neighbor appears significant 
                                                 
76 I examine the data for correlations between Internet access and other control variables and find that the 
only control variable with which Internet access appears to be highly correlated is per capita income. 
77 The models using only the most recent six years contain a maximum of 300 observations.  The standard 
deviation of the Internet access variable during this time period equals 13.34, while the standard deviation 
of insignificant control variables during this same period ranges from 0.11 to 1.85. 
78 As an additional check on the influence of estimated nexus data, I examine the tax competition model for 
all years, including a dummy variable for years in which nexus data is available and interacting this dummy 
variable with the “effective Internet tax rate.”  I find that the interaction is not significant, which indicates 
that the influence of the “effective Internet tax rate” does not differ between the two years in which I have 
nexus data and the other years in the model. 
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in one case, in each case, the F test that all coefficients are equal to zero cannot be 
rejected.  Thus, the model does not appear significant when examining only 2003 and 
2004.  The lack of significance in the model likely relates to the use of only two years of 
data and the small number of tax rate changes (three) that occur during this time period.  
Thus, the model has very low statistical power. 
 
Pew Internet Data 
Table 12 shows the results of the tax competition model including the measure of 
Internet access obtained from surveys conducted by the Pew Internet & American Life 
Project.79  I examine models using the Pew survey data to determine whether results 
related to Internet access using this data source are consistent with results using the 
Internet access data from the CPS Computer Ownership Supplement.  In addition, the 
Pew survey was conducted in each year beginning in 2001, eliminating the need to 
estimate Internet access for years in which the survey was not conducted.  The primary 
results indicate that the interaction between the neighbor’s tax rate and the percentage of 
the population having Internet access is not significant.  In addition, the overall effect of 
Internet access on the sales tax rate does not appear significant.  The total effect of the 
neighbor’s sales tax rate on the weighted average state and local sales tax rate is highly 
significant only when using the Internet definition of a state’s neighbors.  Among control 
variables, I find a significantly positive association between selective sales tax revenue 
                                                 
79 The Pew survey data is included to determine whether results related to Internet access in this survey are 
consistent with the results using data from the CPS Computer Ownership Supplement.  The Pew survey is 
conducted every year.  However, the Pew survey data is available only for years beginning in 2001, and the 
data exhibit high variability in responses related to Internet access from one year to the next.  In addition, 
the Pew survey data includes questions relating to Internet access but does not include any questions related 
to Internet purchases, making it impossible to test Internet purchases with the Pew survey data. 
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and the sales tax rate, and I find a significantly positive relation between the percentage 
of the population that is 65 years of age or older and the state sales tax rate.  The general 
lack of significance in the model using data from the Pew Internet & American Life 
Project may relate to the substantially smaller number of years available using this data 
and the related loss of statistical power.80 
 
Separate Nexus and Lagged Tax Rate 
Table 13 presents results for the tax competition model using the Internet 
neighbor when the “effective Internet tax rate” is separated into the two variables that 
comprise it, the previous year’s home tax rate and the previous year’s nexus percentage.  
I examine this model to determine whether the influence of the “effective Internet tax 
rate” found in the primary analyses is driven by both the tax rate and the percentage of 
Internet sales on which sales taxes would be collected in a given state.  The primary 
results indicate that, as expected, the previous year’s tax rate is significantly positive.  
Because states change their sales tax rates relatively infrequently and the majority of 
these changes are increases, I would expect a strong positive relationship between the 
state’s sales tax rate in the previous year and the state’s current sales tax rate.  The nexus 
percentage appears to have a significantly positive relationship with the state sales tax 
rate, but it does not appear to significantly influence the weighted average state and local 
sales tax rate.  Further, the influence of the nexus percentage on the state’s tax rate 
becomes more positive as the percentage of the population accessing the Internet 
                                                 
80 Due to lagging the explanatory variables and the small number of years during which the Pew survey 
data are available, these regressions could be run using Internet access data from only three years (2001 – 
2003). 
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increases.  Thus, as a higher percentage of Internet vendors collect the sales tax in a given 
state, consumers in that state are likely less able to avoid paying the sales tax by making 
online purchases, allowing the state to increase its sales tax rate with less concern about 
losing its sales tax base to online shopping.  The overall effect of Internet access on the 
sales tax rate is significant and negative in this model, consistent with findings from the 
primary analysis.  In addition, control variables appear very similar to the primary 
analysis.   
 
Tax Competition Model - Internet Purchases 
Most Recent Six Years 
Table 14 describes the results for the tax competition model including a measure 
for Internet purchasing and using data only from 1999 through 2004, when Internet 
purchasing became more widespread.81  Similar to the analysis of Internet access data 
using only more recent years, I examine these models to determine the effect of online 
shopping on sales tax competition for years in which a larger portion of the population 
makes purchases on the Internet.  I would expect online purchasing to have a greater 
influence on sales tax competition during recent years because a larger percentage of the 
population shops online during these years.  The main results look primarily consistent 
with the findings using data from all available years.   I find a significantly positive 
interaction between the neighbor’s tax rate and the percentage of the population making 
Internet purchases for five out of six models.  Thus, these results present further support 
                                                 
81 As can be seen in Table 3, the mean percentage of a state’s population making Internet purchases equaled 
8.29 percent in 1999 and grew to 31.691 percent in 2004.  These percentages demonstrate the growth in the 
popularity of online purchasing when comparing them to the percentage of the population making Internet 
purchases during early years in the sample. 
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for the notion that Internet purchasing influences the response of a state to its neighbors’ 
tax rates.  The overall effect of Internet purchases on the weighted average state and local 
sales tax rate is significant when using the contiguity definition for neighbors or when 
using the “effective Internet tax rate,” while the effect of Internet purchases on the state 
sales tax rate is significant only when using the “effective Internet tax rate” as the 
definition of a state’s neighbors.  This finding differs somewhat from results using all 
years in the dataset, likely due to the much smaller sample size in the model using only 
more recent data.  The overall effect of the neighbor’s sales tax rate on the state’s own 
sales tax rate is significant only when defining a state’s neighbors using the “effective 
Internet tax rate,” which indicates that the state has no significant response to the sales 
tax rate changes of its geographic neighbors in this time period.  However, the neighbor’s 
sales tax rate significantly influences the weighted average state and local sales tax rate 
when using any of the three definitions for neighbors.  These results appear relatively 
similar to the findings when using data from all available years.  As in the Internet access 
model using only the most recent years, the control variables appear largely insignificant 
in this model.  Again, the shorter time period reduces the sample size considerably and 
results in a decrease in statistical power that makes it more difficult to find significance in 
the control variables, which tend to exhibit much less variation than does the Internet 
purchasing variable.82 
 
                                                 
82 The standard deviation of the Internet purchasing variable during this time period equals 8.61. 
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2003 and 2004 Only 
Table 15 shows the results of the tax competition model including a measure for 
Internet purchasing using data only from 2003 and 2004, when the nexus variable is 
available.  As with the Internet access model, I examine these two years separately in the 
Internet purchases model to help determine whether the estimation of the nexus variable 
changes my conclusions related to the influence of online shopping on sales tax 
competition.83  Consistent with the results of the Internet access model for 2003 and 
2004, the model is not significant.  Again, in each case, the F test that all coefficients are 
equal to zero cannot be rejected.  As in the Internet access model, the lack of significance 
in this model likely relates to the small number of years used in the model and the small 
number of tax rate changes in the short time period. 
 
Separate Nexus and Lagged Tax Rate 
Table 16 shows results for the tax competition model using the Internet neighbor 
as the measure of a state’s competitors and separating the “effective Internet tax rate” into 
the previous year’s home tax rate and the previous year’s nexus percentage.  As with the 
Internet access model, I examine this model to determine whether both the tax rate and 
the percentage of Internet sales on which sales taxes would be collected in a state 
influence the state’s sales tax rate.  Consistent with the Internet access model and with 
expectations, the previous year’s sales tax rate is significantly positive.  As in the Internet 
                                                 
83 Again, I examine the tax competition model for all years using a dummy variables for years in which 
nexus data is available as another check on the influence of the estimated nexus data.  I find that the 
interaction of the dummy variable with the “effective Internet tax rate” is not significant, indicating that the 
influence of the “effective Internet tax rate” does not differ between the two years for which I have nexus 
data and the other years included in the model. 
 72 
access model, an increase in the nexus percentage is associated with an increase in the 
state’s sales tax rate but not the weighted average state and local sales tax rate.  The 
influence of the nexus percentage on the state’s tax rate also becomes more positive as a 
larger portion of the population makes online purchases.  Again, this indicates that as 
more Internet vendors collect the sales tax in a state, that state can increase its sales tax 
rate without losing as much of its tax base to online shopping.  The overall effect of 
Internet purchasing on the sales tax rate is significant only when looking at the state sales 
tax rate.  The control variables appear quite consistent with the primary analysis. 
 
Sales Tax Revenue Model 
Most Recent Six Years 
Table 17 presents the results for the sales tax revenue model using data only from 
1999 through 2004.84  I examine models using only the more recent data to determine the 
effect of online shopping on a state’s per capita sales tax revenues for years in which 
online shopping is more common.  I would expect that if online shopping negatively 
impacts sales tax revenues, as policymakers are concerned it does, the influence of these 
Internet purchases would likely be most pronounced during years in which a larger 
portion of the population makes Internet purchases.  The primary results vary slightly 
from the findings using data from all available years.   Both the main effect and the 
overall effect of Internet purchasing on the sales tax revenue per capita are insignificant 
                                                 
84 The limited time dimension in the dataset precludes me from performing common tests for a structural 
break in the data.  Thus, as mentioned, I choose to partition the data at the in 1999 based on an examination 
of the trend in the data as it relates to Internet access and Internet purchases.  I also examine results using 
1998 to 2004 and using 2000 to 2004.  The primary results using either of these alternatives appear 
qualitatively very similar to the results presented for 1999 to 2004. 
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when considering only data from more recent years.85  This finding indicates that in more 
recent years, Internet purchasing has little impact on sales tax revenues.  Thus, consumers 
may have altered the types of items purchased on the Internet somewhat in more recent 
years.  Rather than Internet purchases representing an increase in consumption, these 
purchases may represent a combination of both items that would otherwise not be 
purchased and items that would otherwise be purchased locally.  Thus, the impact of 
Internet purchases on sales tax revenues could be somewhat muted by the mix of items 
purchased.  However, consistent with previous findings, I find a significantly negative 
association between outbound cross-border shopping and per capita state and local sales 
tax revenue.  In addition, I find a significantly positive relation between the sales tax rate 
and per capita sales tax revenue.  The control variables differ somewhat from previous 
findings when examining only data from 1999 until 2004. 
 
Natural Log Transformation 
 Table 18 describes the results for the sales tax revenue model when using natural 
logs of all monetary values.86  I test the sales tax revenue model using a natural log 
transformation to be consistent with prior literature (e.g., Fink et al. 2004, Borg et al. 
1993), which typically uses natural logs for monetary values when modeling tax 
                                                 
85 The finding that no significant association exists between Internet purchasing and per capita sales tax 
revenue for recent years could be due to a smaller sample size.  In contrast, these findings could differ from 
results using all years in the dataset because the full dataset may be capturing some effects of rapid 
technology growth on sales taxable B2B transactions. 
86 Some states may have zero values for some monetary amounts included in the model (e.g., lottery 
revenues).  Therefore, I add 0.1 to all dollar figures before taking the natural log of those amounts. 
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revenues.87  The main results look quite consistent with the findings using the original 
monetary values.  The overall effect of Internet purchasing on per capita sales tax 
revenue is highly significant and, contrary to my hypothesis, implies that increasing 
cross-border shopping through Internet commerce would result in higher sales tax 
revenue per capita.  Traditional measures of cross-border shopping do not appear to 
significantly influence the state’s per capita sales tax revenue.  Consistent with previous 
findings, the sales tax rate exerts a positive and significant influence on per capita sales 
tax revenue.  The control variables are largely consistent with earlier findings. 
 
Internet Cross-Border Shopping Including “Effective Internet Tax Rate” 
Table 19 presents the results for the sales tax revenue model using the “effective 
Internet tax rate” weighted by the percentage of the population making online purchases 
as the definition of the Internet cross-border shopping effect.  I examine models using 
this alternate definition for Internet cross-border shopping to incorporate the influence of 
online shopping in which the sales tax is collected on sales tax revenue per capita.  The 
sales tax is collected on many purchases made on the Internet, and including the 
“effective Internet tax rate” in the sales tax revenue model helps allow for these 
purchases.  The primary results are quite similar to the primary analysis.   The measure of 
Internet-based cross-border shopping indicates that Internet purchasing has a statistically 
significant but economically very small positive influence on the sales tax revenue per 
                                                 
87 I examine scatterplots of my data to determine whether natural log transformations appear appropriate 
and find no patterns that indicate that transformation is necessary.  Tests reveal that these monetary values 
are not normally distributed, and that using the natural logs of these variables helps minimally.  Thus, I 
present my primary results without using the transformations for ease of interpretation and also present the 
results using natural logs for all monetary values. 
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capita when using the “effective Internet tax rate” in the Internet cross-border shopping 
measure.  The measures of traditional cross-border shopping are again largely 
insignificant, except for a significantly negative association between outbound cross-
border shopping and per capita state and local sales tax revenue.  In addition, I find a 
significantly positive relation between the sales tax rate and per capita sales tax revenue.  
The control variables are very similar to previous findings when using this alternate 
definition for Internet cross-border shopping.
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6. Contributions, Limitations, and Extensions 
Previous research in the area of tax competition indicates that governments 
consider the taxes of their neighbors in setting their own tax rates (Conway and Rork 
2004, Luna 2004, Rork 2003, Brueckner and Saavedra 2001, Buettner 2001, Hayashi and 
Boadway 2001, Heyndels and Vuchelen 1998).  Rork (2003) finds a negative relationship 
between the neighbor’s general sales tax rate and a state’s own sales tax rate and 
interprets this as an indication that the general sales tax base is relatively immobile.  The 
current study contributes to this literature by examining horizontal sales tax competition 
among states using data from a time period that includes increasing levels of Internet 
commerce.  Thus, this study investigates the changes in a state’s response to its 
geographic neighbors in the context of an increasingly mobile tax base (proxied by 
increasing Internet usage).  In addition, this study develops a definition of a state’s 
neighbors that includes the impact of online purchasing as a method of cross-border 
shopping.  This study also contributes to the literature that examines the influence of 
online purchasing on a state’s sales tax revenues by separately measuring traditional 
methods of cross-border shopping and a measure of Internet purchasing to determine the 
impact of both forms of cross-border shopping on the resulting sales tax revenue for the 
state. 
One limitation of this study is the comprehensive nature of the general sales tax 
rate.  Because the general sales tax includes a wide range of products in its tax base, 
measuring changes in tax base mobility using the Internet access rate or online 
purchasing rate may not capture the true tax base mobility for some products included in 
the tax base.  While the Internet represents a legitimate medium through which to 
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purchase many products included in a state’s sales tax base, it may be impractical or 
illegal to purchase some items online.  These items may render the tax base less mobile, 
biasing against finding changes in the nature of state sales tax competition resulting from 
the increase in Internet use by consumers.  In addition, the study does not capture the 
variation in the number and types of sales tax exemptions states incorporate into their 
sales tax policies.  I include the presence of an exemption on food items to help mitigate 
this issue.  The overall breadth of the base should also be captured by the tax base 
measure included in the models.  Another limitation relates to online purchases for which 
consumers do pay the sales or use tax.  For purchases from Internet vendors who 
maintain nexus in the state of a consumer or who voluntarily collect the tax, a consumer 
does not avoid the sales tax by purchasing online.  These types of online purchases would 
bias against finding that the increase in Internet use by consumers would alter the nature 
of state sales tax competition.  Additionally, this study cannot adequately capture the 
influence of B2B e-commerce on sales tax competition and sales tax revenues.  Studies 
estimate that B2B e-commerce transactions make up the major portion of e-commerce 
activity (Bruce and Fox 2000, Bruce and Fox 2004).88  This study also cannot capture 
changes over time in the states in which individual companies collect the sales tax and 
must estimate the nexus percentage for many years in the dataset.  Thus, although the t-
statistics and related conclusions regarding the statistical significance of my results 
should not be biased, the magnitude of the coefficient on the “effective Internet tax rate” 
is likely biased upward.  Finally, this study would capture only the influence of online 
                                                 
88 Data necessary to include B2B e-commerce in the current study are not available.  Data related to the 
percentage of the population having Internet access and making Internet purchases are inherently related to 
B2C e-commerce.  Further, Internet vendor information used to calculate the “effective Internet tax rate” 
focuses on vendors making B2C transactions. 
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purchasing on state sales tax rate competition.  It cannot capture other responses 
policymakers may have to the growth in Internet commerce, including changes in state 
sales tax bases and participation in the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP). 
Subject to the limitations above, the results of this study help to shed light on the 
impact on horizontal sales tax competition of the increasing mobility and decreasing 
opportunity cost for consumers related to rising use of the Internet as a retail medium.  
Results indicate that increases in both the percentage of the population having Internet 
access and the percentage of the population making online purchases influence the 
response of a state to its neighbors’ tax rates.  Specifically, results indicate that states 
respond to an increase in the “effective Internet tax rate” by increasing their own sales tax 
rate, and states with higher percentages of Internet users increase their sales tax rate by 
more than those states with fewer Internet users.  Thus, policymakers may opt to attain 
more revenue from local purchases by increasing the sales tax rate instead of lowering the 
sales tax rate to try to limit online purchasing.  In contrast, states respond to changes in 
the tax rates of their geographic neighbors with only small increases in their own sales 
tax rate.  Thus, as Internet usage increases and physical location matters less for 
commerce, policymakers seem to focus little on the sales tax rate changes of their 
geographic neighbors.   
The study also provides evidence on the influence of both traditional and Internet-
based methods of cross-border shopping on a state’s sales tax revenues.  Specifically, the 
results indicate that traditional methods of cross-border shopping generally do not 
significantly influence a state’s per capita sales tax revenue.  Thus, the influence of 
traditional methods of cross-border shopping appears to be limited, likely due to the small 
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percentage of consumers who participate in these methods of cross-border shopping. 
Further, results indicate that, contrary to expectations, sales tax revenue per capita 
appears to increase with an increase in my measure of Internet-based cross-border 
shopping.  Thus, online shopping may not function exclusively as a substitute for local 
forms of shopping but rather may represent an increase in consumption.  These findings 
indicate that electronic commerce may not, at least to this point, represent the loss of 
revenue that policymakers have worried that it would.  Overall, these findings may be 
relevant to state policymakers concerned about the erosion of the sales tax base and who 
may be interested in the influence of increasing Internet commerce on state sales tax 
policy decisions.   
Future research can examine the change over time in the relationship between 
sales taxes and a consumer’s decision to purchase online.  As online purchases become 
increasingly popular and consumers gain experience with online purchasing, their 
sensitivity to tax rates may change.  The Goolsbee (2000a) and Alm and Melnik (2005) 
studies examine the influence of sales taxes on the decision to purchase online.  However, 
both studies examine a cross-section of data in one time period.  The results of a study 
that examines the change in the influence of sales taxes on online purchasing over time 
would be relevant to policymakers interested in the future implications of the current 
sales tax treatment of remote purchases and the related erosion of the sales tax base.  
Future research can investigate the importance of sales taxes relative to other factors in a 
consumer’s decision to purchase online.  Such a study could help shed light on which 
factors are most important in determining whether or not a consumer purchases online 
and the influence of requiring Internet vendors to collect the sales or use tax on the level 
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of online purchases.  Additional research could investigate factors that determine which 
types of businesses may choose to voluntarily collect the sales tax under the simplified 
sales tax system proposed in the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP).  These findings 
would be of interest to policymakers involved in developing the SSTP and those who 
would be involved in discussions of whether to alter the current nexus standard to make it 
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Figure 1: E-Commerce as a Percent of Total Retail (Seasonally Adjusted) 
































Figure 2: Percentage of the Population Having Internet Access and Making Internet 
Purchases 
 




























Contiguity Pop.-Based Contiguity Internet Neighbor
 
Figure 3: Effect of the “Neighbor’s” Tax Rate on the Sales Tax Rate at Different 
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Contiguity Pop.-Based Contiguity Internet Neighbor
 
Figure 5: Effect of the “Neighbor’s” Tax Rate on the Sales Tax Rate at Different 






























Contiguity Pop.-Based Contiguity Internet Neighbor
 
Figure 6: Effect of Internet Purchases on the Sales Tax Rate at Different 
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Figure 8: Effect of the Tax Rate on Per Capita Sales Tax Revenue at Different 
Levels of Internet Purchasing
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition
Base = per capita sales tax base for state i  in year t-1 , adjusted for inflation
CIncTax = per capita corporate income tax revenue for state i  in year t-1 , adjusted for inflation
College = percent of the population with a bachelor’s degree or higher for state i  in year t
ContNeigh = weighted average sales tax rate for state i 's neighbors in year t-1 as defined by the 
contiguity definition
ContNeighWtd = contiguity definition, including both the state and local sales tax rates
Debt = per capita outstanding debt for state i  in year t-1 , adjusted for inflation
Dem = indicator set to 1 if a Democratic governor and majority in state i 's legislature in year t-
1 , zero otherwise
Elect = indicator set to 1 if an election year for state i  in year t-1 , zero otherwise
Expend = per capita expenditures for state i  in year t-1 , adjusted for inflation
Food = indicator set to 1 if state i  exempts food from the sales tax in year t-1 , zero otherwise
InRate = the traditional cross-border shopping effect representing additional sales tax revenues for 
state i  in year t
IntAccess = percent of the population with Internet access for state i  in year t-1
InterRate = the Internet cross-border shopping effect for state i  in year t
IntNeigh = Internet neighbor definition
IntNeighWtd = Internet neighbor definition, including both the state and local sales tax rates
IntPurch = percent of the population that used the Internet to purchase products or services for state 
i  in year t-1
Lottery = per capita lottery revenue for state i  in year t-1 , adjusted for inflation
Nexus = percent of Internet sales by top 100 Internet retailers with nexus in state i in year t
OutRate = the traditional cross-border shopping effect representing lost sales tax revenues for state 
i  in year t
Over65 = percent of the population over age 65 for state i  in year t-1
PCIncome = per capita income for state i  in year t-1 , adjusted for inflation
PIncTax = per capita personal income tax revenue for state i  in year t-1 , adjusted for inflation
PopNeigh = population-based contiguity definition
PopNeighWtd = population-based contiguity definition, including both the state and local sales tax rates
PropTax = per capita property tax revenue for state i  in year t-1 , adjusted for inflation
Rep = indicator set to 1 if a Republican governor and majority in state i 's legislature in year t-
1 , zero otherwise
SalesRev = per capita sales tax revenue for state i  in year t , adjusted for inflation
SchoolAge = percent of the population between the ages of 5 and 17 for state i  in year t
SelTax = per capita selective sales tax revenue for state i  in year t-1 , adjusted for inflation
Tax = sales tax rate for state i  in year t
Trans = per capita federal transfers to state i  in year t-1 , adjusted for inflation
Unemploy = unemployment rate for state i  in year t-1
WtdInRate = state i  in year t , including both the state and local sales tax rates
WtdInterRate = and local sales tax rates
WtdOutRate = i  in year t , including both the state and local sales tax rates
WtdTax = sales tax rate for state i  in year t , including both the state and local sales tax rates  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Base 10.649 5.231 0.000 34.775
CIncTax 0.108 0.140 0.000 2.327
College 24.108 4.739 11.400 38.700
ContNeigh 4.114 1.780 0.000 6.250
ContNeighWtd 4.971 2.152 0.000 7.695
Debt 2.241 1.552 0.417 8.519
Dem 0.182 0.386 0.000 1.000
Elect 0.245 0.430 0.000 1.000
Expend 3.943 1.248 2.354 11.868
Food 0.543 0.495 0.000 1.000
InRate 0.801 2.397 0.000 14.587
IntAccess 37.499 22.364 5.684 83.391
InterRate 0.473 0.585 0.000 2.605
IntNeigh 3.616 1.513 0.000 6.500
IntNeighWtd 4.325 1.726 0.000 7.583
IntPurch 12.154 11.147 0.327 44.057
Lottery 0.040 0.052 0.000 0.396
Nexus 69.526 25.011 0.000 100.000
OutRate 0.484 0.678 0.000 2.984
Over65 12.527 1.892 4.506 18.199
PCIncome 26620.650 4354.945 17413.790 42049.480
PIncTax 0.565 0.579 0.000 12.228
PopNeigh 4.448 1.656 0.000 6.217
PopNeighWtd 5.546 2.070 0.000 8.568
PropTax 0.044 0.096 0.000 0.667
Rep 0.243 0.429 0.000 1.000
SalesRev 0.544 0.265 0.000 1.391
SchoolAge 18.534 1.396 15.442 25.358
SelTax 0.300 0.169 0.130 3.669
Tax 4.667 1.810 0.000 7.000
Trans 0.977 0.325 0.465 3.491
Unemploy 4.943 1.245 2.300 10.400
WtdInRate 0.925 2.430 0.000 14.587
WtdInterRate 0.562 0.685 0.000 3.027
WtdOutRate 0.418 0.601 0.000 2.381
WtdTax 5.522 2.074 0.000 8.917  
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InRate 0.210 0.062 1.000
IntAccess -0.052 -0.053 0.063 1.000
InterRate -0.018 0.027 -0.210 0.518 1.000
IntNeigh 0.034 0.117 -0.573 -0.220 0.214 1.000
IntNeighWtd 0.166 0.257 -0.579 -0.229 0.177 0.880 1.000
IntPurch -0.042 -0.033 0.048 0.955 0.464 -0.203 -0.205 1.000
OutRate -0.182 -0.179 -0.195 0.019 0.180 0.386 0.167 0.025 1.000
PopNeigh 0.883 0.750 0.182 -0.022 -0.120 -0.281 -0.153 -0.020 -0.300 1.000
PopNeighWtd 0.686 0.870 -0.036 0.016 -0.016 -0.146 -0.045 0.029 -0.126 0.778 1.000
SalesRev -0.249 -0.123 -0.485 0.048 0.370 0.680 0.589 0.038 0.255 -0.367 -0.159 1.000
Tax 0.023 0.133 -0.611 -0.046 0.327 0.947 0.825 -0.029 0.442 -0.250 -0.061 0.734 1.000
WtdInRate 0.184 0.054 0.983 0.070 -0.190 -0.548 -0.604 0.057 -0.111 0.159 -0.013 -0.458 -0.575 1.000
WtdInterRate 0.031 0.083 -0.206 0.519 0.971 0.166 0.210 0.466 0.095 -0.074 0.024 0.333 0.278 -0.205 1.000
WtdOutRate -0.130 -0.214 -0.180 0.016 0.153 0.325 0.237 0.026 0.869 -0.303 -0.259 0.169 0.365 -0.147 0.108 1.000
WtdTax 0.169 0.288 -0.609 -0.065 0.317 0.811 0.949 -0.037 0.199 -0.104 0.053 0.629 0.856 -0.627 0.360 0.264 1.000  
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Table 4: Average Tax Rates and Internet Access by Year 
 
Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Tax Rates
Tax 4.609 4.640 4.650 4.650 4.640 4.640 4.633 4.633 4.698 4.718 4.763
WtdTax 5.399 5.450 5.480 5.488 5.478 5.482 5.517 5.539 5.642 5.716 5.715
Internet Variables
IntAccess 10.967 12.103 13.239 14.376 29.564 37.917 46.270 56.878 58.880 60.883 71.408
IntPurch 1.620 1.754 1.888 2.022 5.146 8.290 11.434 20.390 23.281 26.172 31.691








Table 5: Percentage of Internet Vendors with Nexus by State 
 
State Mean Nexus Min. Nexus Max. Nexus
Alabama 77.601 64.407 91.187
Alaska NA NA NA
Arizona 77.078 66.088 88.368
Arkansas 74.051 62.703 85.632
California 80.322 71.925 89.047
Colorado 78.824 66.238 91.774
Connecticut 79.602 65.658 93.974
Delaware NA NA NA
Florida 82.811 68.518 97.814
Georgia 79.867 66.189 94.204
Hawaii 60.912 54.419 67.678
Idaho 75.237 63.891 87.124
Illinois 80.774 68.403 93.563
Indiana 76.455 67.825 85.456
Iowa 77.217 64.423 90.392
Kansas 89.797 79.429 100.000
Kentucky 90.310 80.105 100.000
Louisiana 67.727 56.966 78.834
Maine 75.544 64.886 86.786
Maryland 80.783 68.129 94.063
Massachusetts 72.044 61.198 82.523
Michigan 78.472 66.143 91.289
Minnesota 80.257 66.743 94.306
Mississippi 75.260 62.823 87.876
Missouri 80.001 66.246 94.312
Montana NA NA NA
Nebraska 69.301 60.718 78.222
Nevada 79.745 66.960 92.829
New Hampshire NA NA NA
New Jersey 76.515 70.246 82.601
New Mexico 66.541 57.114 76.292
New York 79.860 69.332 90.890
North Carolina 80.969 68.197 94.229
North Dakota 86.493 75.425 97.337
Ohio 80.132 67.254 93.588  
 101 
Table 5: Continued 
 
State Mean Nexus Min. Nexus Max. Nexus
Oklahoma 77.066 64.674 89.732
Oregon NA NA NA
Pennsylvania 81.904 68.133 96.291
Rhode Island 77.584 65.298 90.440
South Carolina 76.754 64.936 88.972
South Dakota 73.234 61.469 85.321
Tennessee 76.036 67.962 84.403
Texas 78.236 69.231 87.716
Utah 77.366 66.542 88.460
Vermont 60.785 54.525 67.161
Virginia 83.198 69.579 97.299
Washington 92.591 81.945 100.000
West Virginia 67.919 58.781 77.362
Wisconsin 78.753 65.983 92.075
Wyoming 64.352 56.845 72.200  
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Table 6: Percentage of Internet Vendors with Nexus and Effective Tax Rate by 
State, 2003 
 
State Tax WtdTax Nexus IntNeigh IntNeighWtd
Alabama 4.000 7.010 69.529 2.781 4.874
Alaska 0.000 0.000 NA 0.000 0.000
Arizona 5.600 7.868 70.398 3.942 5.539
Arkansas 5.125 6.708 67.230 3.446 4.510
California 6.000 8.917 74.833 4.490 6.673
Colorado 2.900 6.358 71.065 2.061 4.518
Connecticut 6.000 6.000 71.095 4.266 4.266
Delaware 0.000 0.000 NA 0.000 0.000
Florida 6.000 6.302 73.965 4.438 4.661
Georgia 4.000 6.992 71.350 2.854 4.989
Hawaii 4.000 4.000 57.086 2.283 2.283
Idaho 5.000 5.000 68.310 3.415 3.415
Illinois 6.250 6.959 73.224 4.577 5.096
Indiana 6.000 6.000 71.082 4.265 4.265
Iowa 5.000 5.957 69.297 3.465 4.128
Kansas 5.300 6.972 83.756 4.439 5.839
Kentucky 6.000 6.006 84.401 5.064 5.069
Louisiana 4.000 8.145 60.828 2.433 4.955
Maine 5.000 5.000 68.859 3.443 3.443
Maryland 5.000 5.000 72.946 3.647 3.647
Massachusetts 5.000 5.000 65.465 3.273 3.273
Michigan 6.000 6.000 70.831 4.250 4.250
Minnesota 6.500 6.576 71.945 4.676 4.731
Mississippi 7.000 7.000 67.819 4.747 4.747
Missouri 4.225 6.502 71.566 3.024 4.653
Montana 0.000 0.000 NA 0.000 0.000
Nebraska 5.500 6.308 63.959 3.518 4.034
Nevada 6.500 7.000 72.082 4.685 5.046
New Hampshire 0.000 0.000 NA 0.000 0.000
New Jersey 6.000 6.000 72.681 4.361 4.361
New Mexico 5.000 6.574 60.510 3.026 3.978
New York 4.000 8.017 73.449 2.938 5.889
North Carolina 4.500 5.903 73.118 3.290 4.316
North Dakota 5.000 5.910 80.134 4.007 4.736
Ohio 5.000 6.028 72.208 3.610 4.353  
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Table 6: Continued 
 
State Tax WtdTax Nexus IntNeigh IntNeighWtd
Oklahoma 4.500 7.853 69.466 3.126 5.456
Oregon 0.000 0.000 NA 0.000 0.000
Pennsylvania 6.000 6.165 73.309 4.399 4.519
Rhode Island 7.000 7.000 69.993 4.900 4.900
South Carolina 5.000 5.230 69.471 3.474 3.634
South Dakota 4.000 5.083 66.017 2.641 3.356
Tennessee 7.000 8.532 70.900 4.963 6.049
Texas 6.250 8.135 72.440 4.527 5.893
Utah 4.750 6.430 70.828 3.364 4.554
Vermont 5.000 5.000 56.668 2.833 2.833
Virginia 3.500 4.582 74.914 2.622 3.433
Washington 6.500 7.527 86.711 5.636 6.527
West Virginia 6.000 6.002 62.343 3.741 3.742
Wisconsin 5.000 5.283 70.893 3.545 3.746




Table 7: Tax Competition Model (Internet Access) 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
Neighbor -0.1928* -0.1369 -0.0585 0.0266 0.5767*** 0.5114***
(0.1044) (0.1068) (0.0900) (0.0781) (0.0380) (0.0481)
IntAccess -0.0181*** -0.0236*** -0.0168*** -0.0220*** -0.0142*** -0.0194***
(0.0033) (0.0049) (0.0033) (0.0048) (0.0025) (0.0039)
Neigh*IntAcc 0.0017*** 0.0021*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0021*** 0.0017***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Base 0.0154 -0.0217 0.0145 -0.0252* 0.0113 0.0025
(0.0096) (0.0145) (0.0097) (0.0147) (0.0076) (0.0131)
Food 0.0487 0.1825*** 0.0513 0.1878*** 0.0482 0.1334**
(0.0448) (0.0650) (0.0454) (0.0657) (0.0369) (0.0577)
Debt -0.0069 0.0162 -0.0296 -0.0256 -0.0160 -0.0180
(0.0292) (0.0447) (0.0290) (0.0443) (0.0218) (0.0366)
Trans 0.1449* 0.2957** 0.1064 0.2787* 0.0354 0.2000*
(0.0759) (0.1452) (0.0761) (0.1462) (0.0568) (0.1209)
PIncTax 0.1243** 0.2076 0.1423** 0.1358 0.1029*** 0.1622
(0.0598) (0.2183) (0.0598) (0.2208) (0.0344) (0.1897)
CIncTax -0.2645 -0.4843 -0.3577 -0.5948 -0.1665 -0.3088
(0.3046) (0.4690) (0.3049) (0.4728) (0.1705) (0.2658)
PropTax 0.4915*** 0.3613* 0.4466*** 0.2317 0.2992** 0.2214
(0.1473) (0.2098) (0.1481) (0.2158) (0.1177) (0.1834)
Contiguity Population-Based Contiguity Internet
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Table 7: Continued 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
SelTax 0.2345*** -0.8359* 0.2328*** -0.6798 0.1248*** -0.2419
(0.0480) (0.4383) (0.0483) (0.4455) (0.0396) (0.3787)
Expend -0.1246*** -0.0548 -0.1052** -0.0107 -0.0505 -0.0553
(0.0474) (0.0715) (0.0480) (0.0725) (0.0362) (0.0585)
Elect 0.0014 -0.0105 0.0001 -0.0095 -0.0094 -0.0119
(0.0190) (0.0277) (0.0192) (0.0279) (0.0155) (0.0244)
Rep -0.0432 -0.0483 -0.0381 -0.0421 -0.0122 -0.0202
(0.0266) (0.0403) (0.0269) (0.0406) (0.0212) (0.0350)
Dem -0.0363 0.0283 -0.0349 0.0199 -0.0236001 0.0340
(0.0250) (0.0384) (0.0254) (0.0393) (0.0201) (0.0333)
Unemploy 0.0386** 0.0296 0.0454*** 0.0347 0.0306** 0.0391*
(0.0156) (0.0236) (0.0155) (0.0238) (0.0122) (0.0199)
PCIncome 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Over65 -0.0491 -0.1488** -0.0710* -0.1833*** -0.0829*** -0.1463***
(0.0393) (0.0621) (0.0392) (0.0620) (0.0314) (0.0514)
Intercept 7.5683*** 8.5792*** 7.1074*** 8.0556*** 5.0133*** 5.1286***
(0.8587) (1.1662) (0.8274) (1.0965) (0.5854) (0.9055)
Rho 0.9914 0.9888 0.9915 0.9884 0.9794 0.9733
All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Contiguity Population-Based Contiguity Internet
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Table 8: Tax Competition Model (Internet Purchases) 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
Neighbor -0.0911 -0.0374 -0.0038 0.0463 0.6047*** 0.5185***
(0.1080) (0.1057) (0.0923) (0.0788) (0.0391) (0.0490)
IntPurch -0.0120** -0.0147* -0.0100** -0.0136* -0.0143*** -0.0184***
(0.0048) (0.0077) (0.0047) (0.0076) (0.0034) (0.0059)
Neigh*IntPur 0.0030*** 0.0051*** 0.0023*** 0.0031*** 0.0042*** 0.0040***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Base 0.0105 -0.0239 0.0098 -0.0289* 0.0110 0.0001
(0.0098) (0.0147) (0.0099) (0.0149) (0.0077) (0.0132)
Food 0.0765* 0.2391*** 0.0775* 0.2345*** 0.0712* 0.1744***
(0.0461) (0.0665) (0.0465) (0.0675) (0.0373) (0.0589)
Debt -0.0055 0.0326 -0.0223 -0.0097 0.0046 0.0039
(0.0296) (0.0449) (0.0295) (0.0451) (0.0218) (0.0367)
Trans 0.1411* 0.3083** 0.1063 0.2731* 0.0527 0.2017
(0.0785) (0.1475) (0.0782) (0.1490) (0.0572) (0.1226)
PIncTax 0.1059* 0.1252 0.1194** 0.0799 0.0782** 0.0788
(0.0602) (0.2199) (0.0604) (0.2235) (0.0343) (0.1921)
CIncTax -0.1536 -0.3040 -0.2240 -0.4016 -0.0368 -0.1722
(0.3066) (0.4679) (0.3070) (0.4739) (0.1695) (0.2662)
PropTax 0.4427*** 0.2498 0.3935** 0.1244 0.3435*** 0.2916




Table 8: Continued 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
SelTax 0.2399*** -0.6901 0.2337*** -0.6156 0.1201*** -0.1901
(0.0494) (0.4434) (0.0496) (0.4521) (0.0402) (0.3833)
Expend -0.1072** -0.0223 -0.0943* 0.0102 -0.0450 -0.0369
(0.0484) (0.0720) (0.0490) (0.0735) (0.0363) (0.0587)
Elect -0.0008 -0.0138 -0.0015 -0.0124 -0.0132 -0.0190
(0.0194) (0.0280) (0.0196) (0.0283) (0.0156) (0.0247)
Rep -0.0385 -0.0459 -0.0336 -0.0331 0.0103 -0.0013
(0.0273) (0.0407) (0.0276) (0.0412) (0.0215) (0.0354)
Dem -0.0368 0.0386 -0.0356 0.0298 -0.0252 0.0354
(0.0257) (0.0390) (0.0260) (0.0402) (0.0203) (0.0338)
Unemploy 0.0324** 0.0129 0.0403** 0.0243 0.0199 0.0275
(0.0163) (0.0243) (0.0161) (0.0245) (0.0124) (0.0204)
PCIncome -0.0000** -0.0000* -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Over65 -0.0391 -0.1389** -0.0562 -0.1708*** -0.0873*** -0.1487***
(0.0398) (0.0618) (0.0397) (0.0622) (0.0313) (0.0511)
Intercept 6.6927*** 8.4662*** 6.4105*** 8.2552*** 4.6242*** 5.1832***
(0.8514) (1.1761) (0.8194) (1.1381) (0.5745) (0.9351)
Rho 0.9914 0.9888 0.9914 0.9884 0.9802 0.9757
All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Contiguity Population-Based Contiguity Internet
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Table 9: Sales Tax Revenue Model 
 
























(0.0055) (0.0065)  
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Table 9: Continued 
 














All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.




Table 10: Tax Competition Model, 1999 – 2004 (Internet Access) 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
Neighbor -0.2011 -0.0366 -0.0874 0.0185 0.6367*** 0.2399***
(0.1920) (0.1815) (0.1696) (0.1266) (0.0770) (0.0911)
IntAccess -0.0131** -0.0182* -0.0111 -0.0162* -0.0120** -0.0158*
(0.0066) (0.0092) (0.0069) (0.0095) (0.0052) (0.0081)
Neigh*IntAcc 0.0014* 0.0023** 0.0007 0.0015 0.0027*** 0.0022***
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Base 0.0257 0.0214 0.0266 0.0167 0.0293* 0.0336
(0.0211) (0.0291) (0.0213) (0.0294) (0.0168) (0.0267)
Food 0.0630 0.1317 0.0605 0.1314 0.0487 0.1248
(0.0686) (0.0949) (0.0691) (0.0955) (0.0583) (0.0907)
Debt -0.0534 -0.0102 -0.0614 -0.0279 -0.0278 -0.0319
(0.0595) (0.0820) (0.0598) (0.0829) (0.0452) (0.0707)
Trans 0.0538 0.2645 0.0487 0.2930 0.0376 0.2495
(0.1409) (0.1961) (0.1424) (0.1966) (0.1137) (0.1778)
PIncTax 0.0181 0.2674 -0.0058 0.2505 -0.0127 0.0384
(0.2461) (0.3404) (0.2462) (0.3413) (0.1991) (0.3198)
CIncTax -0.3721 -0.2788 -0.4229 -0.3043 -0.1739004 -0.1597
(0.4460) (0.6139) (0.4479) (0.6174) (0.2766) (0.4316)
PropTax 0.0978 0.0214 0.1165 -0.0374 0.1006 0.1340




Table 10: Continued 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
SelTax 0.3317 0.6546 0.3230 0.7021 0.1462 0.4415
(0.5449) (0.7600) (0.5537) (0.7710) (0.4555) (0.7100)
Expend -0.1201* -0.0932 -0.1186 -0.0828 -0.0450 -0.1070
(0.0718) (0.0998) (0.0730) (0.1017) (0.0567) (0.0879)
Elect -0.0121 0.0049 -0.0119 0.0049 -0.0182 0.0007
(0.0270) (0.0374) (0.0272) (0.0376) (0.0228) (0.0355)
Rep -0.0415 -0.0797 -0.0363 -0.0644 -0.0189 -0.0512
(0.0420) (0.0580) (0.0421) (0.0585) (0.0348) (0.0543)
Dem -0.0487 0.0412 -0.0469 0.0409 0.0076 0.0585
(0.0410) (0.0567) (0.0411) (0.0574) (0.0339) (0.0524)
Unemploy 0.0148 0.0468 0.0154 0.0473 0.0236 0.0594*
(0.0283) (0.0390) (0.0285) (0.0392) (0.0221) (0.0347)
PCIncome -0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Over65 0.0202 0.0433 -0.0089 0.0105 -0.0148 0.0473
(0.0788) (0.1098) (0.0767) (0.1078) (0.0641) (0.0989)
Intercept 7.8335*** 5.8536*** 7.2602*** 6.1865*** 3.5909*** 3.7987***
(1.6496) (2.2350) (1.5511) (2.2002) (1.1373) (1.7879)
Rho 0.9910 0.9870 0.9911 0.9869 0.9652 0.9771
All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 11: Tax Competition Model, 2003 – 2004 (Internet Access) 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
Neighbor 3.9381** 1.9924 2.2304 0.6613 -0.5144 0.7278
(1.4482) (1.8488) (1.5303) (1.7026) (1.1730) (1.2486)
IntAccess 0.1619* 0.1237 0.0430 0.0241 -0.0299 0.0903
(0.0903) (0.1654) (0.0980) (0.1747) (0.0762) (0.0874)
Neigh*IntAcc -0.0318* -0.0311 -0.0071 -0.0130 0.0102 -0.0315
(0.0179) (0.0261) (0.0188) (0.0254) (0.0199) (0.0197)
Base 0.0333 0.0583 0.0359 0.0697 0.0265 -0.0578
(0.0473) (0.0956) (0.0512) (0.0972) (0.0508) (0.0706)
Food 0.1870 0.2532 0.1036 0.2075 -0.0613 0.1788
(0.1495) (0.2581) (0.1596) (0.2584) (0.1455) (0.1884)
Debt -0.1297 -0.3228 -0.2371 -0.3537 -0.0956 -0.1088
(0.1811) (0.3375) (0.1956) (0.3406) (0.1894) (0.2522)
Trans -0.3177 -0.1678 -0.1622 0.0072 -0.1326 0.2357
(0.2336) (0.4503) (0.2312) (0.4221) (0.2538) (0.3140)
PIncTax -1.4500 -0.4621 -1.1604 0.3703 -0.8042 -0.9697
(1.0232) (2.0089) (1.0626) (2.0090) (1.1352) (1.5004)
CIncTax -0.9202 -0.3166 -0.2863 0.1357 0.0809 0.3447
(1.0278) (1.8819) (1.0413) (1.8824) (1.0804) (1.4107)
PropTax -3.8012 -1.5427 -2.6914 -1.7678 1.0215 -3.0622
(4.0252) (7.1187) (4.1664) (7.1384) (4.1771) (5.4485)
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Table 11: Continued 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
SelTax 1.3481 2.6243 1.2469 3.2051 0.1674 4.4095
(2.0335) (3.8930) (2.1466) (3.9116) (2.6151) (3.0734)
Expend -0.3520 -0.5829 -0.1300 -0.3964 -0.0777 -0.0780
(0.3334) (0.6130) (0.3439) (0.5911) (0.2806) (0.3639)
Elect -0.0293 -0.0569 -0.0442 -0.0951 -0.0582 -0.0108
(0.0565) (0.1167) (0.0592) (0.1195) (0.0646) (0.0830)
Rep 0.0834 0.0177 0.0781 0.0145 0.0262 0.0279
(0.0916) (0.1727) (0.0969) (0.1757) (0.1008) (0.1328)
Dem -0.1369 -0.0003 -0.0633 0.0789 0.0437 0.0802
(0.1098) (0.1962) (0.1126) (0.1944) (0.0978) (0.1276)
Unemploy -0.0855 0.0585 -0.0784 0.0150 -0.0227 -0.0363
(0.1062) (0.2039) (0.1122) (0.2146) (0.1185) (0.1553)
PCIncome -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Over65 0.3757 0.5104 0.3085 0.6971 0.4514 0.4735
(0.7206) (1.3637) (0.7579) (1.4013) (0.8246) (1.0279)
Intercept -12.7191 -8.8663 -6.3305 -5.9395 3.9993 -4.4047
(11.9836) (21.8219) (12.9376) (21.9905) (11.9878) (15.2209)
Rho 0.9977 0.9783 0.9972 0.9808 0.9906 0.9974
All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 12: Tax Competition Model, Pew Internet Access Data (Internet Access) 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
Neighbor -0.0372 0.1041 -0.1601 -0.0565 0.1479 -0.5399***
(0.2743) (0.2747) (0.2600) (0.2133) (0.1624) (0.1874)
IntAccess -0.0020 0.0022 -0.0048 0.0027 0.0048 0.0056
(0.0064) (0.0092) (0.0069) (0.0102) (0.0034) (0.0049)
Neigh*IntAcc 0.0011 0.0001 0.0016 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0010
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0013)
Base 0.0406 0.0346 0.0390 0.0351 0.0497 -0.0299
(0.0330) (0.0508) (0.0327) (0.0505) (0.0335) (0.0504)
Food 0.0102 0.2548 0.0035 0.2409 0.0252 0.2015
(0.1010) (0.1550) (0.1009) (0.1553) (0.0998) (0.1428)
Debt -0.0312 -0.1823 -0.0299 -0.1715 -0.0111 -0.1599
(0.1204) (0.1814) (0.1192) (0.1824) (0.1169) (0.1662)
Trans -0.1178 -0.0584 -0.1421 -0.0433 -0.1377 -0.0013
(0.1783) (0.2753) (0.1775) (0.2735) (0.1780) (0.2538)
PIncTax -0.1093 -0.4731 -0.1132 -0.4175 -0.0629 -0.4713
(0.3736) (0.5762) (0.3684) (0.5686) (0.3674) (0.5245)
CIncTax -0.3346 -0.2879 -0.2975 -0.2596 -0.3586 -0.4649
(0.6921) (1.0208) (0.6739) (1.0166) (0.6647) (0.9428)
PropTax -0.2463 -3.0662 -0.2578 -3.0525 -0.1803 -2.8457




Table 12: Continued 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
SelTax 2.7108** 3.7088** 2.6908** 3.4670* 2.9030** 4.6567***
(1.1930) (1.8144) (1.1841) (1.7833) (1.1874) (1.6850)
Expend -0.1610 -0.1908 -0.1648 -0.2090 -0.1659 -0.2550
(0.1499) (0.2307) (0.1487) (0.2316) (0.1497) (0.2118)
Elect -0.0543 -0.0377 -0.0574 -0.0440 -0.0529 -0.0427
(0.0443) (0.0681) (0.0442) (0.0689) (0.0440) (0.0627)
Rep 0.0341 0.0485 0.0291 0.0400 0.0354 0.0861
(0.0620) (0.0931) (0.0612) (0.0939) (0.0620) (0.0875)
Dem 0.0203 0.0471 0.0245 0.0511 0.0123 0.0185
(0.0689) (0.1035) (0.0675) (0.1035) (0.0655) (0.0922)
Unemploy -0.0218 0.1027 -0.0185 0.1033 -0.0269 0.0775
(0.0647) (0.0987) (0.0641) (0.0985) (0.0644) (0.0920)
PCIncome 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Over65 0.6533** 0.6663 0.6806** 0.7087 0.6775** 0.7084
(0.3256) (0.4844) (0.3258) (0.4882) (0.3138) (0.4465)
Intercept -3.2524 -5.9407 -2.5303 -5.0971 -3.9848 -3.2593
(4.5990) (7.1426) (4.6562) (7.0770) (4.5387) (6.5451)
Rho 0.9941 0.9896 0.9943 0.9902 0.9935 0.9960
All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 13: Continued 
 
Variable State





















All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1,
respectively.




Table 14: Tax Competition Model, 1999 – 2004 (Internet Purchases) 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
Neighbor -0.1438 0.0050 -0.0575 0.0411 0.7188*** 0.2943***
(0.1951) (0.1695) (0.1712) (0.1153) (0.0786) (0.0898)
IntPurch -0.0065 -0.0081 -0.0036 -0.0073 -0.0103* -0.0103
(0.0076) (0.0102) (0.0073) (0.0102) (0.0058) (0.0089)
Neigh*IntPur 0.0024** 0.0044*** 0.0013 0.0025** 0.0041*** 0.0033***
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0010)
Base 0.0202 0.0177 0.0204 0.0116 0.0311* 0.0324
(0.0208) (0.0285) (0.0210) (0.0289) (0.0165) (0.0264)
Food 0.0791 0.1609* 0.0784 0.1557 0.0633 0.1441
(0.0688) (0.0941) (0.0695) (0.0955) (0.0576) (0.0905)
Debt -0.0512 0.0025 -0.0585 -0.0255 -0.0068 -0.0108
(0.0602) (0.0824) (0.0606) (0.0839) (0.0450) (0.0708)
Trans 0.0682 0.2913 0.0529 0.3032 0.0212 0.2353
(0.1413) (0.1945) (0.1429) (0.1966) (0.1127) (0.1779)
PIncTax 0.0452 0.3279 0.0137 0.2908 0.0006 0.0679
(0.2477) (0.3399) (0.2487) (0.3435) (0.1973) (0.3168)
CIncTax -0.3293 -0.2017 -0.3671 -0.2313 -0.1443 -0.1120
(0.4437) (0.6072) (0.4472) (0.6149) (0.2714) (0.4277)
PropTax 0.0627 -0.0974 0.0905 -0.1014 0.1612 0.1988




Table 14: Continued 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
SelTax 0.5373 0.9570 0.5011 0.8670 0.2098 0.5999
(0.5445) (0.7492) (0.5549) (0.7602) (0.4462) (0.7035)
Expend -0.1217* -0.0902 -0.1222* -0.0911 -0.0522 -0.1194
(0.0719) (0.0991) (0.0730) (0.1011) (0.0564) (0.0882)
Elect -0.0168 -0.0026 -0.0170 -0.0016 -0.0297 -0.0126
(0.0268) (0.0368) (0.0270) (0.0373) (0.0223) (0.0352)
Rep -0.0397 -0.0771 -0.0334 -0.0587 -0.0008 -0.0344
(0.0421) (0.0575) (0.0422) (0.0584) (0.0347) (0.0546)
Dem -0.0399 0.0600 -0.0389 0.0561 0.0141 0.0633
(0.0415) (0.0566) (0.0414) (0.0579) (0.0336) (0.0524)
Unemploy 0.0172 0.0484 0.0200 0.0517 0.0203 0.0567
(0.0283) (0.0386) (0.0285) (0.0390) (0.0220) (0.0349)
PCIncome -0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0001** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Over65 0.0403 0.0824 0.0085 0.0323 0.0020 0.0694
(0.0785) (0.1089) (0.0767) (0.1072) (0.0629) (0.0980)
Intercept 6.7705*** 4.5227*** 6.8862*** 5.2860** 3.4249*** 3.3818*
(1.6281) (2.1045) (1.6273) (2.0670) (1.1455) (1.8181)
Rho 0.9911 0.9878 0.9912 0.9874 0.96341 0.9784
All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 15: Tax Competition Model, 2003 – 2004 (Internet Purchases) 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
Neighbor 2.4112** 1.2487 1.6097* 0.3447 0.0699 -1.0422**
(0.9387) (0.9517) (0.9455) (0.6709) (0.4347) (0.4282)
IntPurch 0.1178 0.2286 0.0340 0.1352 0.0348 0.0671
(0.0718) (0.1363) (0.0656) (0.1308) (0.0484) (0.0677)
Neigh*IntPur -0.0161 -0.0258 0.0031 -0.0116 0.0051 -0.0063
(0.0145) (0.0194) (0.0134) (0.0166) (0.0100) (0.0120)
Base 0.0215 0.0052 0.0254 0.0269 0.0197 -0.0843
(0.0487) (0.0992) (0.0501) (0.1018) (0.0493) (0.0723)
Food 0.1399 0.3363 0.0298 0.2508 -0.0809 0.1859
(0.1585) (0.2635) (0.1674) (0.2650) (0.1398) (0.1930)
Debt -0.1707 -0.3303 -0.2496 -0.3225 -0.1058 -0.1381
(0.1797) (0.3303) (0.1897) (0.3380) (0.1828) (0.2576)
Trans -0.3436 -0.4326 -0.2114 -0.1752 -0.2366 0.0605
(0.2438) (0.4756) (0.2359) (0.4454) (0.2525) (0.3403)
PIncTax -1.8509* -0.9652 -1.5036 0.0126 -1.3263 -0.4750
(1.0184) (2.0795) (1.0236) (2.1142) (1.0957) (1.4965)
CIncTax -0.8192 -0.5164 -0.3669 0.0910 -0.0515 0.0749
(1.0129) (1.8758) (0.9995) (1.8867) (1.0367) (1.4330)
PropTax -3.7643 -3.2881 -2.1330 -2.3379 1.2270 -2.6917




Table 15: Continued 
 
Variable State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local State
Wtd. State and 
Local
SelTax 0.8459 3.9550 0.5499 3.9128 -0.3855 5.7174*
(1.9285) (3.5774) (1.9607) (3.6773) (2.3361) (2.8801)
Expend -0.2666 -0.6533 -0.0522 -0.4153 -0.1030 -0.1177
(0.3374) (0.6038) (0.3364) (0.5843) (0.2688) (0.3720)
Elect -0.0244 0.0213 -0.0428 -0.0460 -0.0531 -0.0190
(0.0581) (0.1228) (0.0576) (0.1238) (0.0621) (0.0858)
Rep 0.0741 0.0667 0.0619 0.0594 0.0232 0.0646
(0.0888) (0.1639) (0.0917) (0.1699) (0.0988) (0.1408)
Dem -0.0948 0.0016 -0.0390 0.0769 0.0353 0.0685
(0.1055) (0.1868) (0.1048) (0.1865) (0.0942) (0.1313)
Unemploy -0.0834 0.0988 -0.0633 0.0499 -0.0239 -0.0519
(0.1062) (0.2037) (0.1096) (0.2165) (0.1140) (0.1602)
PCIncome -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Over65 0.0892 0.5593 0.0984 0.7414 0.2406 0.8218
(0.7060) (1.3227) (0.7192) (1.3851) (0.7450) (0.9969)
Intercept -2.6321 -11.1487 -0.6374 -9.7052 4.6428 -4.1786
(9.9282) (18.3106) (10.3303) (18.7076) (10.0856) (13.7603)
Rho 0.9977 0.9846 0.9972 0.9854 0.9901 0.9975
All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 16: Continued 
 
Variable State





















All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1,
respectively.




Table 17: Sales Tax Revenue Model, 1999 – 2004 
 
























(0.0067) (0.0077)  
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Table 17: Continued 
 














All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.




Table 18: Sales Tax Revenue Model, Natural Log Transformation 
 


























Table 18: Continued 
 














Note: All monetary values are naturally logged.
All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.





Table 19: Sales Tax Revenue Model, Effective Internet Tax Rate 
 


























Table 19: Continued 
 














All regressions contain state and year fixed effects.
***, **, * represent significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Variables are not lagged for the sales tax revenue model.
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